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The Principles of Federal Pollution
Control Law*
Mark Sagoff**
Environmentalism at its inception was a grand vision, one that
nearly all Americans willingly shared. Somehow that vision of the es-
sential unity of nature and of the need for bringing industrial society
into harmony with it has been lost among the parts per billion, and
with it we have lost the capacity to reach social consensus on environ-
mental policy.1
INTRODUCTION
Americans in the 1980s, as surveys consistently show, sup-
port the consensus and share the "grand vision" of the 1960s
and 1970s concerning environmental legislation.2 The belief
that the nation, through "agency-forcing"3 and "technology-
* © 1986, Environmental Law Institute. This essay will appear in a
treatise on environmental law edited by Sheldon Novick and published by the
Environmental Law Institute.
** Research Associate, Center for Philosophy and Public Policy, Univer-
sity of Maryland. I wish to thank Sheldon Novick for constant guidance, many
helpful suggestions, and unstinting encouragement without which this essay
could not have been written. All the errors, however, are my own, and the
views expressed herein are not necessarily those of the Environmental Law
Institute or any other organization or agency.
1. Ruckelshaus, Risk, Science, and Democracy, ISSUES ScI. & TECH.
Spring 1985, at 19, 30.
2. For a survey of public opinion polls, see Mitchell, Public Opinion and
Environmental Politics, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1980s; REAGAN'S
NEW AGENDA 51 (N. Vig & M. Kraft eds. 1984). Relevant polls are also re-
ported in U.S. CouNciL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QuALITY, PUBLIC OPINION ON EN-
VIRONMENTAL ISSUES (1980).
3. The Clean Air Act is described as "agency-forcing" by Ackerman &
Hassler, Beyond the New Deak Coal and Clean Air Act, 89 YALE L.J. 1466,
1470 (1980). Professor David Schoenbrod describes the 1970 Act as "in the first
instance, a law that regulates government rather than sources of pollution. It
requires government-both federal and state-to take certain actions by cer-
tain dates." Schoenbrod, Goals-Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the
Clean Air Act 30 UCLA L. REV. 740, 742 (1983). See also L. CALDWEI4 ENVI-
RONMENT: A CHALLENGE TO MODERN SOCIETY 218-19 (1970) (distinguishing
environmental legislation that declares a national policy in the preamble from
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, which "treated the establish-
ment of a national policy as a major substantive provision of the legislation").
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forcing' 4 legislation, can achieve its ambitious environmental
goals as quickly as had been hoped, however, may have been
lost.5 Environmental lawyers and professionals, therefore, gen-
erally have turned their attention from the principles and pur-
poses underlying pollution control law6 to the controversial and
4. The Clean Air Act instructs the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to set technology-based emission limits for new stationary sources and
modifications of existing sources. 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (1982); 40 C.F.R. § 60.15
(1985). "Modification" is defined as "any physical change in, or change in the
method of operation of, a stationary source which increases the amount of any
air pollutant emitted by such source or which results in the emission of any air
pollutant not previously emitted." 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4). These limitations in
turn reflect "the degree of emission reduction achievable through the applica-
tion of the best system of continuous emission reduction .... " Id
§ 7411(a)(1)(C).
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act also requires technology-based
standards for new sources, 33 U.S.C. § 1316, and old sources, id. § 1311. After
1977, the Water Pollution Control Act required that existing sources meet
standards reflecting the "best practicable control technology currently avail-
able." Id. § 1311(b)(1)(A). After 1984, that requirement rose to a level reflect-
ing the "best available technology economically achievable." Id.
§ 1311(b)(2)(A). For new sources, the Act imposed a standard determined by
reference to the "best available demonstrated control technology." Id.
§ 1316(a)(1).
For a study of judicial review of the technology-forcing aspects of pollu-
tion control law, see J. BONINE & T. McGARITY, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION 337-372 (Clean Air Act) and 454-84 (Clean Water Act) (1984). For
criticisms of technology-forcing provisions, mostly from an economic perspec-
tive, see Dewees, The Costs and Technology of Pollution Abatemen in AP-
PROACHES TO CONTROLLING AIR POLLUTION 291 (A. Friedlaender ed. 1978); La
Pierre, Technology-forcing and Federal Environmental Protection Statutes, 62
IOWA L. REV. 771 (1977); Magat, The Effects of Environmental Regulation on
Innovation, 43 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 4 (1979); Note, Technology-Based
Emission and Effluent Standards and the Achievement of Ambient Environ-
mental Objectives, 91 YALE L.J. 792 (1982).
5. Many Americans at the time believed that the coming technological
revolution (computers, biotechnology) would make pollution obsolete, so that
only temporary solutions, e.g., pollution control technologies, would be neces-
sary. Thus, Gene Bylinsky, commenting in 1969 on the euphoric expectations
of the day, wrote:
To judge by the pronouncements from Washington, we can now
start looking forward to cleaner rather than ever dirtier rivers. The
Administration has declared a "war" on pollution, and the Secretary
of the Interior Walter J. Hickel says, "We do not intend to lose."
Adds Murray Stein, enforcement chief of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Administration: "I think we are on the verge of a tremen-
dous cleanup."
Bylinsky, The Limited War on Water Pollution, in THE ENVIRONMENT A NA-
TIONAL MISSION FOR THE SEVENTIES 19 (1970). Senator Edmund Muskie stated
that the 1970 Clean Air Act, which he sponsored, would achieve clean air goals
by directing officials to take specific actions by specific deadlines. 116 CONG.
REc. 32,902 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Muskie).
6. Unfortunately, environmental lawyers and professionals may take for
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contested policies intended, sometimes obliquely, to carry them
out.
The "grand vision" underlying pollution control law en-
compasses two basic approaches or attitudes toward pollution
that have become so familiar and have gained such general ac-
ceptance that discussion of environmental legislation must be-
gin with them. The first attitude is ethical and cultural; the
second is prudential and economic.
Those who adopt the first approach resent pollution as an
illegitimate form of exploitation of individuals and of the envi-
ronment. This attitude regards pollution with horror and dis-
taste and calls for a new environmental ethic to bring the
nation into greater harmony with nature.
During the 1970s, these moral and cultural attitudes coa-
lesced into a political consensus. In response, Congress enacted
a series of major pollution control statutes. Proponents of
these statutes had argued that corporations would not volunta-
rily develop or install adequate pollution control technology.
Pollution control statutes, therefore, intended in part to im-
prove corporate behavior, and with it, environmental quality
and public safety and health.
Americans blamed themselves, however, and not merely
corporations, for pollution; it was commonplace to quote the fa-
mous cartoon character Pogo to the effect that we are our own
worst enemy.7 Editorial opinion, political rhetoric, and expert
testimony condemned pollution as a symbol of national irre-
sponsibility for which the country would pay dearly. Ameri-
cans' selfish, short-sighted, and greedy emphasis on personal
granted, or even regard as boilerplate, the principles and purposes underlying
pollution control law. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON EN-
VIRONmiENTAL DECISION MAKING, DECISION MAKING IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY 5 (1977) ("Even the most ringing declaration of Congres-
sional purpose to defend, maintain, and enhance environmental values must
be read with caution. It is common legislative practice to include such declara-
tions, but to impede their implementation with restrictive statutory language
or procedures that make enforcement more difficult."); see generally Hender-
son & Pearson, Implementing Federal Environmental Policies: The Limits of
Aspirational Commands, 78 COLUimi. L. REv. 1429, 1444 (1978) (broad declara-
tions of legislative purpose are ineffective regulatory tools because of the diffi-
culty of enforcement).
7. See the obituary of Walt Kelly, creator of the comic strip Pogo, in N.Y.
Times, Oct. 19, 1973, at 46, col. 3:
One of Mr. Kelly's most famous lines was written not for his strip
but for a Pogo poster drawn in 1970 to promote anti-pollution efforts.
Pogo, appearing bewildered in a forest setting surrounded by a litter
of garbage, exclaims: "We have met the enemy, and they is us."
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consumption, according to this perspective, had induced the na-
tion to trade its magnificent natural heritage for a mess of con-
sumer porridge.
Students of American history may hear in the rhetoric of
the 1970s echoes of the jeremiads in which religious and polit-
ical leaders in the past, speaking at awakenings and revivals, in-
veighed against the nation's declension from its traditional
moral and religious ideals and condemned the national pursuit
of material things.8 A prominent scientist, writing in 1970, ex-
pressed the certainty that "[a]ll over the world, technological
civilization is threatening the elements of nature that are es-
sential to human life and the values that make it worth liv-
ing."9 Another observer of the environmental "bandwagon"
commented in 1971 that "[t]he environmental hysteria is, in es-
sential, a symbolic protest of men against the encroaching grip
of technology on the quality of individual life, a swing of the
pendulum from the euphoric decades when science and tech-
nology were matters of national pride and utopian hope."10
Those who adopt the economic approach, in contrast, re-
gard pollution as the by-product of ordinary economic activity,
the right thing in the wrong place. This attitude accepts pollu-
tion that is now too costly to control, and would allow markets,
when they take all the costs of pollution into account, to deter-
mine the means of regulation.
Adherents to this economic approach argue that "as impor-
tant as technology, politics, law, and ethics are to the pollution
question, all such approaches are bound to have disappointing
results, for they ignore the primary fact that pollution is an
economic problem."' According to this view, the principal
cause of pollution and the key to its control lie in the diver-
8. For a description and a history of these jeremiads, see P. MILLER, NA-
TURE'S NATION 14-49, 90-133 (1967). The idea that the lust for material profit
and prosperity has lured us from our basic ethical principles and brought us to
the brink of disaster is at least as old as Calvinism and has been a staple of the
environmental movement. Thus, a prominent Congregationalist minister told
an Earth Day crowd: "[E]nvironmental rape is a fact of our national life only
because it is more profitable than responsible stewardship of Earth's limited
resources." EARTH DAY-THE BEGINNING 72, 74 (1970) (quoting Channing E.
Phillips speech, "Unity," Sylvan Theater, Washington, D.C., April 22, 1970).
9. Dubos, The Human Landscape, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, March 1970,
at 31.
10. King, The Environmental Bandwagon, in ECOCiDE-AND THOUGHTS
TOWARD SURVIVAL 189, 190 (C. Fadiman & J. White eds. 1971).
11. Ruff, The Economic Common Sense of Pollution, in POLLUTION, RE_
SOURCES, AND THE ENvIRoNMENT 37 (A. Enthoven & A. Freeman eds. 1973).
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gence between the social and private costs of production: pol-
luters are able to "pass on" the costs of pollution to society as a
whole without being forced to pay for and, therefore, to reflect
those costs in the prices they charge for their products.
If pollution costs could be "internalized" in markets and
were not "externalized" to society as a whole, pollution, accord-
ing to this view, in general would not be a problem. Polluters
would have an incentive to reduce pollutants to a level at which
any further reduction would cost society as a whole more than
it would be willing to pay for any increase in benefits. It is not
"unethical" reliance on markets, therefore, but the failure of
markets to function properly, according to this analysis, that
makes wasteful practices more profitable than responsible
stewardship of the earth's limited resources.-2
Both the ethical and economic approaches to pollution con-
trol law are important, and both have legitimate roles to play in
the formation of environmental policy. Although each ap-
proach may make a significant contribution, neither by itself
suffices as a conceptual basis for regulatory policy. This Article
suggests how the strengths of both approaches may be com-
bined into a unified description of federal pollution control stat-
utes, and into a unified strategy for interpreting and
implementing the statutes.
Part I of the Article traces the ethical origins of federal
pollution control statutes and shows that Congress enacted en-
vironmental laws in response to a rising surge of deeply-felt
moral, cultural, and communitarian public expectations and
demands.
Part II then examines the relevance of the efficiency norm
in implementing pollution control laws. Part II assumes that if
clean air and water are to be treated as scarce resources, they
should be allocated, insofar as possible, by free, competitive,
fair, and informed markets. This Part argues, however, that
even if markets are excellent institutions for allocating re-
sources, this provides no argument for the efficiency norm in
public policy. Market allocations are desirable not necessarily
because they are efficient, but for other reasons. Part II fur-
12. For this approach, see generally W. BAUMOL & W. OATS, THE THEORY
OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1975); J. DALEs, POLLUTION, PROPERTY, AND
PRICES (1968); A. FREEMAN, R. HAvEMAN, & A. KNEESE, THE ECONOMICS OF
ENViRONMENTAL POUCY (1973). For a good annotated bibliography of the
literature, see Fisher & Peterson, The Environment in Economics: A Survey,
14 J. ECON. LIT. 1 (1976).
1986]
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ther contends that the efficiency norm has no ethical merit or
worth against which the values underlying environmental laws
can be weighed.
Part III explores the relationship between the ethical and
economic approaches and suggests a way to reconcile them.
Americans often conceive the ends of environmental law inde-
pendently from the means necessary to achieve them. Part III
proposes that we should instead deliberate over the means and
ends together, lest the perfect environment Americans contem-
plate in theory become an obstacle to the good environment we
can achieve in fact.
Finally, the Article concludes that strong ethical reasons
support revising pollution control laws so that they contem-
plate at once environmental goals together with the means nec-
essary and available to achieve them.
I. THE MORAL BASIS OF POLLUTION CONTROL LAW
Pollution control laws, in their most general terms, belong
to a long tradition of humanitarian legislation intended to ame-
liorate man's inhumanity to man. Since the time of the aboli-
tion movement, reformers in the United States have used
federal law as a force for social improvement. Congress has
ended child labor, improved unconscionable conditions in sweat
shops, company towns and mines, and set a maximum workday
and a minimum wage. Congress also has relieved the suffering
of the very poor, provided some public health care, and estab-
lished other programs that may vindicate our nation's claim to
being a compassionate community concerned about the health,
safety, and well-being of the individual citizen.
Between 1969 and 1978, Congress enacted eight major pol-
lution control statutes as part of a wave of environmental and
civil rights legislation.13 These statutes answer to the moral as-
13. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, Pub. L. No. 92-
516, 86 Stat. 975 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982 & Supp. III
1985)); Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)); Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat.
816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. II 1984)); Safe
Drinking Water Act, Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 300F-300J-10 (1982 & Supp. II 1984)); National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982 & Supp. II 1984)); Noise Control Act of 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918 (1982 &
Supp. II 1984)); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982 &
[Vol. 71:19
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pirations of American society. As one observer noted, "[o]nly a
Scrooge or a misanthrope would quarrel with the intent of the
new wave of federal regulation-safer working conditions, bet-
ter products for the consumer, elimination of discrimination in
employment, reduction of environmental pollution, and so
forth."14 The "new wave" of federal regulation took its place in
the history of legislation intended to improve the background
conditions against which people make choices and live their
lives.
A surge of rising public expectations provided the impetus
for congressional enactment of pollution control laws in the
1970s. Public expectations centered on four normative issues.
The first sprung from popular sympathy for or empathy with
the victim of pollution-the worker, neighbor, homemaker, or
child who is injured or dies as a result of exposure to a toxic
substance in the workplace or in the environment.
The second issue concerned the protection of rights. Tradi-
tional forms of private law protection, such as tort remedies,
did not work in many cases involving injury and death caused
by pollution.'5 Private law remedies, therefore, needed public
law supplements. 16
In addition, Americans also were concerned about pollution
for cultural and patriotic reasons quite apart from the dangers
that, from a scientific point of view, pollutants posed to individ-
uals. Americans were committed to the idea that America is
and ought to remain beautiful. Smog filled air, polluted rivers,
Supp. II 1984)); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84
Stat. 1676, and of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. II 1984)).
14. M. WEiDENBAUM, BusINEss, GOVERNMENT, AND THE PUBLic 21 (2d ed.
1981).
15. In some cases, however, tort remedies work well. Tort law remains
the primary defense individuals have against hazardous pollutants in the envi-
ronment. See Brodeur, The Asbestos Industry On Tria4 THE NEW YORKER,
July 1, 1985 at 36, 79, col. 3.
16. George Eads and Peter Reuter studied corporate responses to liability
law and regulation and concluded that "product liability is the most significant
influence on product safety efforts." G. EADS & P. REUTER, DESIGNING SAFER
PRODUCTs: CORPORATE RESPONSES TO PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND REGULA-
TION Vii (1983). Speaking of industries subject only to moderate regulatory
pressure, e.g., only to regulation by the Consumer Products Safety Commis-
sion, these authors stated that "regulatory actions... may be perceived as im-
portant or unimportant depending primarily on their impact on a firm's
liability exposure." Id. at viii. This Article examines later the relationship be-
tween tort and public regulation of pollution. See infra notes 42-58 and accom-
panying text.
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dead lakes, and fouled land offended our cultural values and
our sense of national dignity and pride.
Finally, while markets helped consumers form and satisfy
personal preferences, democratic political institutions allowed
citizens collectively to deliberate over and choose common goals
and aspirations that they could not achieve or perhaps even im-
agine alone. Efforts to preserve the country's natural heritage
and to reduce environmental pollution provided ways, actual
and symbolic, to build and express a sense of national commu-
nity without infringing on the freedom of each individual to
pursue his own pleasures and live his own life.
This first part examines each of these four ways of under-
standing the moral basis of federal pollution control law.
A. COMPASSION FOR THE INDMDUAL VICTIM OF POLLUTION
Senator Edmund Muskie, writing in 1969, captured the
popular mood of the time:
We are confronted with the terrible prospect that the American
dream of the good life may turn out to be a nightmare. Our efforts to
improve our lives may have created hazards from which there is no
escape. From this time forward we must devote as much energy and
ingenuity to the elimination of man-made hazards to man as we have
to the expansion of his ability to harness energy and materials to his
desires.
1 7
Americans agonized over rivers catching fire, species be-
coming extinct, wildlife disappearing, oil spills, fish kills, deter-
gents foaming in rivers and lakes, beach closings, and any
number of horrors which led them to regard pollution as a
menace gone out of control.18 When the astronauts returned
from the moon with pictures showing North America covered
with clouds of pollution, moreover, Americans felt ashamed as
well as afraid. Titles of the books popular at the time reflect
the ominous mood: Silent Spring,19 Vanishing Air,20 This En-
dangered Planet,21 The aosing Circle,22 The Darkening Land,23
17. Muskie, Statement, in THE ENVIRONMENT: A NATIONAL MISSION FOR
THE SEVENTIES 15, 16 (1970).
18. See Erskine, The Polls: Pollution and its Costs, 36 PuB. OPINION Q. 120
(1972); Sills, The Environmental Movement and its Critics, 3 HuM. ECOLOGY 1
(1975).
19. R. CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
20. J. EsPoSrro, VANISHING AIR (1970).
21. R. FALK, THIS ENDANGERED PLANET: PROSPECTS AND PROPOSALS FOR
HUMAN SURVIVAL (1972).
22. B. COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE: NATURE, MAN, AND TECHNOL-
OGY (1971).
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and so on.24
The plight of individuals, sometimes neighbors, associates,
and friends, who suffered or died as a result of toxic pollutants,
moved Americans. These tragic situations engaged the con-
science of the nation and led the public, congressional district
by congressional district, to demand legislation like the Clean
Air 25 and Clean Water Acts,26 which were based solely or pri-
marily on the protection of health and the environment. The
events of Earth Day, April 22, 1970, suggest the extent to which
Americans engaged in political action and public demonstra-
tions aimed at making the federal government control pollution
and protect the quality of the natural environment. John
Quarles wrote that "[t]he spontaneity, size, and intensity evi-
dent in the thousands of demonstrations across the land left no
doubt that Americans were gripped by a new concern. '27 Ac-
cording to John Whitaker, "there is still only one word, hyste-
ria, to describe the Washington mood on the environment issue
in the fall of 1969. The words pollution and environment were
on every politician's lips."'28
Accordingly, the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA) set forth a national policy to "assure for all
Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and cul-
turally pleasing surroundings." 29 In a series of pollution con-
23. W. LONGGOOD, THE DARKENING LAND (1972).
24. Other examples include: P.K. ANDERSON, OMEGA; MURDER OF THE
ECoSYSTEM AND SUICIDE OF MAN (1971); M. BENARDE, OUR PRECIOUS HABITAT
(1973); G. BORGSTROM, THE HUNGRY PLANET- THE MODERN WORLD AT THE
EDGE OF FAMINE (1972); J. DoRsT, BEFORE NATURE DIES (1971); Eco-CATAS-
TROPHE, (Editors of Ramparts eds. (1970)); P. EHRLICH, THE END OF AFFLU-
ENCE (1974); P. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB (1968); ECOCIDE-AND
THOUGHTS TOWARD SURVIVAL, supra note 10; D. MEADOWS, J. RANDERS, & W.
BEHRENS, THE LZnUTS OF GROWTH (2d ed. 1974); W.W. PADDOCK & P. PAD-
DOCK, FAMNE 1975! AMERICA'S DECISION: WHO WILL SURVIVE? (1967); R.
VACCA, THE COMING DARK AGE (1973). Notably, this literature prompted a
backlash, e.g., J. MADDOX, THE DOOMSDAY SYNDROME (1972); P. BECKMAN,
ECO-HYSTERICS AND THE TECHNOPHOBES (1973); C. ADLER, ECOLOGICAL FAN.
TASIES: DEATH BY FALLING WATERMELONS (1978).
25. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. II 1984)).
26. Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), Pub. L. No.
92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 &
Supp. II 1984)).
27. J. QUARLES, CLEANING UP AMERICA: AN INSIDER'S VIEW OF THE ENVI-
RONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 12-13 (1976).
28. J. WHITAKER, STRIKING A BALANCE: ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL
RESOURCES POLICY IN THE NIxoN-FoRD YEARS 27 (1976).
29. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 101, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4331(b)(2) (1982).
1986]
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trol statutes enacted during the 1970s, Congress attempted to
make this policy operational and, especially, to protect the
health and safety of individuals. Congress did so, for instance,
by requiring the Administrator of the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) to set standards for air pollutants to assure
an "adequate margin of safety" to protect the public health.30
With respect to "hazardous" pollutants, Congress required an
"ample" margin of safety.3 ' The Senate Subcommittee on Air
and Water Pollution made it clear in its report that the EPA
should protect the health of each American, including those in
the most sensitive groups.3 2
Legislators soon became aware-they may have been aware
from the start-that safe "threshold" levels cannot be deter-
mined for many important pollutants.33 The statutes, however,
30. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 § 106, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1)
(1982).
31. Id. § 7412(b)(1)(B).
32. The Committee stated:
[Tihe Committee emphasizes that included among those persons
whose health should be protected by the ambient standard are partic-
ularly sensitive citizens such as bronchial asthmatics and em-
physematics who in the normal course of daily activity are exposed to
the ambient environment. In establishing an ambient standard neces-
sary to protect the health of these persons, reference should be made
to a representative sample of persons comprising the sensitive group
S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. 10 (1970), reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON
PUBLIC WORKS, 93RD CONG., 2D SEss., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN
AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970, at 410 (1974). For an overview of the relation of
sensitive groups and pollution control policy, see R. FRIEDMAN, SENSITIVE
POPULATIONS AND ENViRONMENTAL STANDARDS (1981).
In its concern with the safety of every individual, the Clean Air Act, as
critics often complain, appears "cost-oblivious." Rodgers, Benefits, Costs, and
Risks: Oversight of Health and Environmental Decisionmaking, 4 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 191, 201 (1980). The Act also appears to preclude a cost-benefit
test of air quality standards. See R. CRANDALL, CONTROLLING INDUSTRIAL
POLLUTION: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF CLEAN AIR 59 (1983); J. KRIER
& E. URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY 312-45 (1977); L. LAVE & G. OMENN,
CLEARING THE AIm REFORMING THE CLEAN AIR ACT 45-46 (1981); Currie, Di-
rect Federal Regulation of Statutory Sources Under the Clean Air Act, 128 U.
PA. L. REV. 1389, 1460-63 (1980) ("The statutory requirement of absolute
health protection through source controls ought to be modified. The Agency
should be authorized to take cost into consideration under Section 112(b).");
Currie, Relaxation of Implementation Plans Under the 1977 Clean Air Act
Amendments, 78 MICH. L. REv. 155, 158 (1979).
33. Apparently, Congress knew when it passed the Clean Air Act that
"safe" thresholds may be impossible to determine, but it used the "margin of
safety" language anyway, delegating to others the problem of making that lan-
guage operational. Looking back seven years later on the events of 1970, Sena-
tor Muskie testified:
[Vol. 71:19
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by and large either ignore or paper over this problem. The
Clean Water Act, for example, delegates the problem to others
by requiring "a margin of safety which takes into account any
lack of knowledge concerning the relationship between effluent
limitations and water quality. '3 4
Even if it is sometimes difficult, or perhaps impossible, to
determine "safe" levels for particular pollutants, in certain in-
stances it has been easy to determine that existing levels are
unsafe. By early 1974, for example, officials found twenty-five
cases of angiosarcoma among vinyl chloride workers.35 Because
this rare form of liver cancer is associated primarily with expo-
sure to vinyl chloride, these workers knew how and where they
had been injured. The public became concerned because it
could sympathize with these workers and their families; the
Our public health scientists and doctors have told us there is no
threshold, that any air pollution is harmful. The Clean Air Act is
based on the assumption, although we knew at the time it was inaccu-
rate, that there is a threshold. When we set the standards, we under-
stood that below the standards that we set there would still be health
effects. The standard we picked was simply the best judgment we had
on the basis of the available evidence as to what the unacceptable
health effects in terms of the country as a whole would be.
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Envi-
ronmental Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1977) (statement of Sen. Muskie).
34. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(c) (1982). A comparison between the Clean Air,
Clean Water, and Safe Drinking Water Acts and a statute like the Mine Safety
Act of 1969 illustrates the fundamental purpose and the fundamental problem
of the pollution control statutes. The Mine Safety Act requires that "[e]very
hoist... shall be equipped with ... hoisting cable adequately strong to sustain
the fully loaded platform, cage, or other device; and have a proper margin of
safety." Federal Coal Mine and Safety Act of 1969 § 314(a), 30 U.S.C. § 874(a)
(1982). The Mine Safety Act resembles pollution control legislation in that it
intends to protect the health and safety of all those affected by its provisions,
in this instance, those who operate hoists or work on or under hoisted plat-
forms.
The crucial difference that makes the Mine Safety Act so much easier to
implement than the Clean Air Act is that one can compute threshold levels at
which cables will break under given loads. It is also fairly easy and not very
costly to manufacture cables to meet those requirements. Safe thresholds for
pollutants are not nearly as easy to determine, however, and they are certainly
more costly to achieve. The Clean Air and Mine Safety Acts are alike in their
principle and purpose: both seek to protect the safety of the individual. These
laws differ primarily in the contingent problems which make it much more
difficult to set and to satisfy safety standards for pollutants than for rope and
cables. For a history of the "margin of safety" concept in federal legislation,
see Thompson, Margin of Safety as a Risk-Management Concept in Environ-
mental Legislation, 6 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 2-15 (1979) (providing legislative
history, case law development and administrative interpretation of the
concept).
35. Novick, In Defense of Irrational Laws, 3 ENVTL. F. 10, 11 (1984).
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victim might have been a neighbor, husband, or friend. The
public feared as well for itself, because vinyl chloride was used
as an aerosol in many consumer products and escaped into the
environment. Public agencies, including the EPA, moved
quickly to control vinyl chloride exposure in the workplace and
in the environment and took the dangerous products from gro-
cery store shelves.36
When dozens, scores, or hundreds of people die as a direct
and provable result of exposure to particular substances, such
as asbestos and vinyl chloride, a clear consensus forms to deter-
mine the appropriate course of action. The EPA and other
agencies entrusted with protecting public health have no choice
but to regulate the known causes of specific cancers occurring
in identifiable human beings.
In refining regulations to deal with less egregious instances
of pollution, however, the EPA and other agencies found that it
was not always possible to take in the moral dimensions of the
situation all at once. It might be comparatively easy to deter-
mine the right thing to do if "safe" thresholds could be estab-
lished, if causal pathways could be traced, and if risks could be
reliably assessed. Nonetheless, degrees of hazard and safe
threshold levels are often indeterminate. In these instances,
the moral and compassionate path is elusive, and it is difficult
to arrive at a clear consensus about the proper course to take.
Thus, discussions of pollutants that are unrelated to an
identifiable and peculiar disease tend to use statistical terms re-
flecting percentages rather than persons, and differences
among populations rather than between individuals. Although
the image of a school child with asbestosis engages our moral
conscience, a statistical increase in the incidence of the disease
may merely provoke ponderings on representations of weighted
hierarchical step-wise regressions and Ames microbial
mutagenesis assays. When confronted with the risk asbestos im-
36. The EPA proposed a 10 parts per million (ppm) limit on vinyl chloride
emissions; and at these levels, the risks are arguably de minimis. Proposed
Standard for Vinyl Chloride, 40 Fed. Reg. 59535-36 (1975). Because no safe
threshold for vinyl chloride has been determined, however, the 10 ppm stan-
dard appeared to violate the "margin of safety" requirement of the law. Under
pressure from an Environmental Defense Fund suit, the EPA proposed to
make the standard more stringent by requiring emissions to be reduced to 5
ppm within three years of the proposed rule amendment's adoption. See Na-
tional Emission Standards For Hazardous Air Pollutants, 42 Fed. Reg. 28154-57
(1977) (proposed amendment to 40 C.F.R. § 61.62). Under pressure from indus-
try, however, the EPA retained the 10 ppm standard. See 40 C.F.R. § 61.62
(1985).
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poses on the school child, moral sentiments inspire the demand
to protect children by eliminating the hazard. On the other
hand, moral sensibilities are rarely ignited, for example, when
various studies show, while others fail to show, an association
between trihalomethanes in drinking water and an increased
incidence of cancers of the colon and bladder.37
Moral intuitions, moreover, struggle with the knowledge
that regulations that reduce some risks increase others.38 The
trihalomethanes or haloforms associated with increased inci-
dence of bladder cancer, for example, result from typical water
treatment procedures that protect the public health.39 As Jus-
tice Powell observed, the "shutdown of an urban area's electric
service could have an even more serious impact on the health
of the public than that created by a decline in ambient air qual-
ity."'40 Vinyl chloride, the base material for a common plastic,
is used in thousands of commercial products, such as phono-
graph records, pipes, upholstery, and floor tile. One may won-
der if these goods could be produced with materials that pose
37. See Cantor, Hoover, Mason & McCabe, Association of Cancer Mortal-
ity with Halomethanes in Drinking Water, 61 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 979, 979
(1978) ("Adequate assessment of possible risks has been hampered by differ-
ences in industrial, socioeconomic, and demographic risk factors between
populations exposed to various concentrations of THM [trihalomethanes] and
by the lack of prior specification of the types of cancer likely to be involved.");
Hogan, Chi, Hoel & Mitchell, Association Between Chloroform Levels in Fin-
ished Drinking Water Supplies and Various Site-Specific Cancer Mortality
Rates, 2 J. ENvTL. PATHOL. TOXICOL. 873, 884 (1979) (due to the restrictions of
the assumptions and observations of data, correlations "between chloroform
levels in finished drinking water supplies and cancer mortality for specific
sites such as the bladder and the rectum-intestine" may be invalid).
38. This point is emphasized in Huber, Exorcists vs. Gatekeepers in Risk
Regulation, REGULATION, Nov.-Dec. 1983, at 23, 28 ("The paradox of risk regu-
lation is that too much of it makes life more dangerous. Not just more expen-
sive . .. but more dangerous."). See also Huber, Safety and the Second Best
The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 277,
279 (1985) ("greater private safety is often to be found in the greater accept-
ance of public risk").
39. Rook, Formation of Haloforms During Chlorination of Natural Wa-
ters, 23 WATER TREAT. EXAM. 234, 243 (1974).
40. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 272 (1975) (Powell, J., concur-
ring). Justice Powell's concurring opinion continues:
The result apparently required by this legislation [the Clean Air Act]
in its present form could sacrifice the well-being of a large metropoli-
tan area through the imposition of inflexible demands that may be
technologically impossible to meet and indeed may no longer be nec-
essary to the attainment of the goal of clean air.
I believe that Congress, if fully aware of this Draconian possibil-
ity, would strike a different balance.
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fewer risks to the public. Questions such as these may inhibit
the ability of people in many situations to judge the moral
dimensions of pollution at a glance.
This is not to concede that the original social consensus has
been lost among the parts per billion: public opinion has not
changed. It is just that engaged moral sentiments are insuffi-
cient in many instances, and regulators require a more de-
tached or theoretical perspective to reach ethical decisions.
B. RIGHTS AND ENTITLEMENTS
For centuries, common law courts have protected individu-
als from injuries of the sort typically caused by pollution. If the
wastes from a person's privy percolate through his wall and
into his neighbor's cellar, for example, common law will re-
quire the polluter to cease and repair the nuisance, because, as
an English court found in 1705, he is "bound of common right
to keep his wall so as his filth might not damnify his neigh-
bour."41 In thousands of cases, some of which law students
study in their first year, courts have enjoined and awarded
damages for all sorts of nuisances and other torts involving
pollution.
Some might argue that factories are similarly bound of
common right to maintain their walls, scrubbers, filters, liners,
drums, or stacks so that their emissions and effluents do not
harm their neighbors or the public. This seems to be a truism,
yet private law does not suffice to protect the rights in ques-
tion. Public law, therefore, must protect these rights.
Within the considerable amount of literature addressing
this issue, commentators argue that many practical problems
prevent the common law from dealing adequately with large-
scale and long-range wastes and pollutants.4 A good deal of
pollution, from automobiles for example, affects millions of
41. Tenant v. Goldwin, 1 Salk. 360, 91 Eng. Rep. 314 (K.B. 1705).
42. See, e.g., Ginsberg & Weiss, Common Law Liability for Toxic Torts: A
Phantom Remedy, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859 (1981); Mithollin, Long-Term Liabil-
ity for Environmental Harm, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1979); Rosenberg, The
Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the
Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REV. 849 (1984); Note, Environmental Health. An
Analysis of Available and Proposed Remedies for Victims of Toxic Waste Con-
tamination, 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 61 (1981); Note, The Inapplicability of Tradi-
tional Tort Analysis to Environmental Risks: The Example of Toxic Waste
Pollution Victim Compensation, 35 STAN. L. REV. 575 (1983); Note, Hazardous
Waste Disposal- Is There Still a Role for Common Law?, 18 TULSA L.J. 448
(1983).
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people, many of whom may feel aggrieved by this invasion of
their person. The exhaust from any car, however, may not in-
jure any individual enough to give him a cause of action against
its owner. The costs of litigation are likely to prevent any indi-
vidual from bringing a tort action against automobile owners or
manufacturers, even if the aggregate damage automobile pollu-
tion inflicts on society as a whole is very high. Furthermore,
many or most people might be defendants and plaintiffs at the
same time. Defendants, in this instance, may include everyone
who drives; plaintiffs may include everyone who breathes. Po-
tential plaintiffs and defendants are too many and the injuries
too small to allow for progress on a case-by-case basis.
The problems involved in proving a causal relationship be-
tween a pollutant and a particular injury also have prevented
the courts from developing effective remedies for large-scale
pollution. Notorious and hazardous pollutants-in places like
Love Canal and Three Mile Island, and with agents like dioxin
and radon gas-affect the environment of large numbers of
people, some of whom may be injured as a result. Others who
are also exposed may suffer the same kind of injury, but as a
consequence of other causes. 43 As one writer observes, "[t]he
question that plagues mass exposure cases is specific causation:
when there are alternative possible sources of the plaintiff's in-
43. Because courts place importance on the right which a plaintiff asserts
in a lawsuit, and not simply on the extent of the damage complained of, plain-
tiffs who show only a slight degree of injury may nevertheless obtain standing
to sue. For example, in United States v. SCRAP, the Supreme Court found
that the plaintiffs, a group of law students who used environmental resources,
e.g., parks, had asserted the "specific and perceptible harm" needed to distin-
guish them from purely ideological plaintiffs, even though the Court noted the
"attenuated line of causation to the eventual injury of which the appellees
complained." United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Pro-
cedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973). The Court cautioned that the
"pleading must be something more than an ingenious academic exercise in the
conceivable." Id
In Sierra Cub v. Morton, the Supreme Court validated environmental in-
jury as a basis for standing, arguing that
aesthetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are
important ingredients of the quality of life in our society, and the fact
that particular environmental interests are shared by the many rather
than by the few does not make them less deserving of legal protection
through the judicial process.
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972). In this case, the Court appar-
ently attributed the plaintiff's calculated refusal to allege an injury, e.g., fail-
ure to plead its use of the Mineral King Valley, as an attempt to obtain a
license to represent and defend the environment wherever it is threatened.
See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. at 735-36 n.8.
1986]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
jury, which source is actually responsible?"' '
In some respects, tort law has expanded to accommodate
cases in which a plaintiff cannot show a "but for" cause. In
DES cases, for example, plaintiffs have been able to sue all
DES manufacturers, even if they cannot show specifically
which manufacturer caused their particular injury.45 In DES
cases, however, the defendant is indeterminate. In toxic tort
cases involving environmental hazards, in contrast, it is gener-
ally the plaintiffs who are indeterminate. Although a pollu-
tant may in fact increase the incidence of cancer among the
exposed population, it may be impossible to discern which indi-
viduals in that population contracted cancer as a result of expo-
sure to the pollutant.
Moreover, statutes of limitations permit individuals only a
few years to sue to remedy a tort injury. It often takes longer
than the limitations period, however, for toxic substances to mi-
grate from where they are dumped to where they cause dam-
age, for exposure to manifest itself in injury, or for a person to
acquire the information necessary to understand the nature of
the injury. Furthermore, when the victim becomes aware of
his injury, many potential defendants may have gone out of
business or become insolvent, and the insurer at the time of ex-
posure may not be the insurer when the injury manifests itself.
Even a solvent defendant may avoid paying damages by litigat-
ing technical issues to the point of exhausting the plaintiff fi-
nancially, or by filing for bankruptcy.46
44. Rosenberg, supra note 42, at 855-56. The problem of establishing
causal connections vexes attempts to establish interstate comity with regard to
the transport of pollutants, especially sulfur dioxide, across state lines. One is-
sue is the inadequacy, not to say uselessness, of air transport models and the
inadequacy of data. See, e.g., Thomas v. New York, No. 85-5970 (D.C. Cir. Sept.
18, 1986). In Thomas, the D.C. Circuit reversed a finding that the EPA admin-
istrator had a duty to identify states responsible for acid deposition in New
York and other areas of the northeastern United States and Canada and to is-
sue State Implementation Plan revision notices to those states. In remanding
with instructions to dismiss, the court stated that "[tihe [district] court was not
troubled by the EPA's argument that identifying which states to notify would
be time consuming, costly and perhaps impossible ...."
45. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, cert denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). See also Delgado, Beyond Sindel"
Relation of Cause-In-Fact Rules for Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CALIF. L.
REV. 881, 883 (1982) ("explor[ing] the feasibility and desirability of extending
tort theories to permit recovery in the reverse-Sindell situation").
46. E.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 26 Bankr. 405 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(financially healthy asbestos manufacturing corporation filed for reorganiza-
tion in bankruptcy to limit its potential $2 billion liability to victims of asbesto-
sis); see also Comment, In re Johns-Manville Corp- The Delicate Balance of
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Finally, swift technological advances create hazards and
fears with which the common law cannot keep pace. Political
action is therefore often required to protect individuals and
their property from harm. Large-scale environmental and
technological risks, like those involved at Three Mile Island,
are not at issue in the usual defendant's-privy-damages-neigh-
bor's-cellar sort of lawsuit.47 Where the harm is catastrophic
and irreversible, the probability of harm is difficult to measure
and is inclined toward subjective estimation. When radioactive
emissions from nuclear power plants are involved, political and
technical questions arise that can hardly be settled on a case-
by-case basis by the incremental wisdom of common law courts.
Even traditional environmental nuisances such as smoke
and dust may raise political and technical issues that strain the
common law's resources. An often cited case, Boomer v. Atlan-
tic Cement Company,48 illustrates the point. Plaintiffs sought
to enjoin a cement company "from emitting dust and raw
materials" in operating its plant.49 The trial judge found that
Atlantic "created a nuisance insofar as the lands of the plain-
tiffs [were] concerned," but refused to grant the injunction, not-
ing the "defendant's immense investment in the Hudson River
Valley, [and] its contribution to the Capital District's econ-
omy."50 In allowing the plaintiffs damages rather than injunc-
tive relief, the trial court emphasized that the "company
installed at great expense the most efficient devices available to
prevent the discharge of dust and polluted air into the atmos-
phere."5' An appellate tribunal, in upholding the lower court,
also observed as a relevant factor that the company used the
"most modern and efficient devices to prevent offensive emis-
sions and discharges. '52
During the 1960s and 1970s, however, the public became
Fairness Between Bankruptcy and Products Liability Law, 3 J.L. & CoM. 365
(1983) (evaluating the effects of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code on the interests of
products liability claimants and suggesting changes).
47. For a discussion of "environmental risks" posed by novel technologies,
see Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 207, 208-14 (1978).
48. 55 Misc. 2d 1023, 287 N.Y.S.2d 112 (1967), aff'd, 30 A.D.2d 480, 294
N.Y.S.2d 452 (1968), rev'd and remanded, 26 N.Y.2d 219, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 257
N.E.2d 870 (1970) (granting an injunction against the nuisance until the trial
court determined the proper amount of permanent damages for the plaintiffs
in place of the temporary damages previously awarded).
49. 55 Misc. 2d at 1024, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 113.
50. Id at 1025, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
51. Id. at 1024, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 113.
52. Boomer, 30 A.D.2d at 481, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 453.
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worried that pollution could reach intolerable levels overall-
indeed, worried that pollution had already done so-even when
industries, under threat of tort action, installed the "most effi-
cient devices available" to control emissions. These devices, in
other words, were unacceptable to the public even if they were
acceptable to the courts.53 Accordingly, Congress insisted on
technological improvement to change the equation by which
equities were balanced in the courts. Public pollution control
legislation, therefore, tends to be technology-based and technol-
ogy-forcing. It encourages industry to develop and install bet-
ter-than-currently-available pollution control technology for
both existing and new plants.54
In emphasizing safety and in forcing the development of
technology intended to minimize and eventually to eliminate
hazardous pollution, public law, like private law, serves to pre-
vent one person from harming or exploiting another simply for
his own advantage. Public law does so, however, not by award-
ing post-injury compensation, but by seeking to prevent the in-
jury before it happens. Pollution control law, therefore, does
not replace tort law, and should not be construed as an attempt
to limit individuals' rights to assert claims. Rather, pollution
control law supplements tort law. It attempts to eliminate or at
least reduce the harms to individuals and to the environment
that private law fails to deter.55 Thus, the insistence of public
53. See J. Bonine, The Evolution of 'Technology-Forcing' in the Clean Air
Act, Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 21 (July 25, 1975). Bonine writes that Edward Lee
Rogers of the Environmental Defense Fund criticized the result of the New
York Court of Appeals decision in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. in a hearing
on the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, stating that:
The Court discussed the state of the art and said they could not fore-
see any improvement in the [state of the art in the] future. I think
that is a step in the wrong direction. I think the courts and legislators
have to provide inducements to industry to see that there will be im-
provements in the state of the technology and such inducements have
to be written into the law.
Id. at 14 (footnotes omitted) (citing Hearings on S. 3229, S. 3466, and S. 3546
Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on
Public Works, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 849 (1970)).
54. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia praised this "tech-
nology-forcing" strategy as evidence of the EPA's "commitment to the devel-
opment of sound guidelines." Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 510
F.2d 692, 712-13 n.105 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
55. It is a commonplace criticism of utilitarian approaches to public policy
that such approaches treat individuals not as persons but as locations where
one finds preferences which then may be aggregated in the general social
calculus. This objection, which goes back at least to F. BRADLEY, ETHIcAL
STUDIEs 85-141 (2d ed. 1927) ("Happiness, in the meaning of a maximum of
pleasure, can never be reached; and what is the sense of trying to reach the
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law on reducing risk is an extension of private law protections
of the rights, dignity, and integrity of persons.56
Nevertheless, neither public nor private law can "concern
itself with trifles, or seek to remedy all the petty annoyances
and disturbances of everyday life in a civilized community. '57
Rather, the standards set should protect 'the ordinary comfort
of human existence' as understood by the American people in
their present state of enlightenment."5 8 Public pollution con-
trol laws express the "present state of enlightenment" concern-
impossible?" Id. at 104.), has been forcefully argued by Hart, Between Utility
and Rights, 79 COLUI i. L. REV. 828, 829 (1979) ("In the perspective of classical
maximi[z]ing utilitarianism separate individuals are of no intrinsic importance
but only important as the points at which fragments of what is important, ie.
the total aggregate of pleasure or happiness, are located."), and Sen & Wil-
liams, Introduction, in UT=iTARANIsM AND BEYOND 1, 4 (A. Sen & B. Wil-
liams eds. 1982) ("Essentially, utilitarianism sees persons as locations of their
respective utilities-as the sites at which such activities as desiring and having
pleasure and pain take place.... Persons do not count as individuals in this
any more than individual petrol tanks do in the analysis of the national con-
sumption of petroleum.").
56. Libertarians argue from this premise for a complete proscription of
pollution. Murray Rothbard, for example, writes:
From the beginnings of modern air pollution, the courts made a
conscious decision not to protect, for example, the orchards of farmers
from the smoke of nearby factories or locomotives. They said, in ef-
fect, to the farmers: yes, your private property is being invaded by
this smoke, but we hold that "public policy" is more important than
private property, and public policy holds factories and locomotives to
be good things. These goods were allowed to override the defense of
property rights-with our consequent headlong rush into pollution
disaster. The remedy is both "radical" and crystal clear, and it has
nothing to do with multibillion dollar palliative programs at the ex-
pense of the taxpayers which do not even meet the real issue. The
remedy is simply to enjoin anyone from injecting pollutants into the
air, and thereby invading the rights of persons and property. Period.
The argument that such an injunction prohibition would add to the
costs of industrial production is as reprehensible as the pre-Civil War
argument that the abolition of slavery would add to the costs of grow-
ing cotton, and therefore should not take place. For this means that
the polluters are able to impose the high costs of pollution upon those
whose property rights they are allowed to invade with impunity.
Hospers, What Libertarianism Is, in THE LIBERTARIAN ALTERNATIVE: ESSAYS
IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 15 (T. Machan ed. 1974) (quoting Roth-
bard, The Great Ecology Issue, 2 INDiviDuALisT 5 (1970)). See generally Hos-
pers, id. (libertarians would consider pollution as a violation of property rights
actionable as a trespass, stopping pollution at its source); Machan, Pollution
and Political Theory, in EARTHBOUND: NEW INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS IN ENVI-
RONMENTAL ETHICS 74, 98 (T. Regan ed. 1984) ("libertarianism rejects in prin-
ciple the use of cost-benefit analysis as a basis to justify pollution"). But see
Novick, supra note 35.
57. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTs § 88, at 626 (5th ed. 1984).
58. Id at 628 (quoting J. JOYCE & H. JOYCE, NUISANCES § 20 (1906)).
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ing the importance of the individual's safety and health versus
the importance of registering new pesticides or expanding the
nuclear power industry. It remains to be determined whether
this current state of enlightenment provides a basis from which
to develop workable pollution control standards.
C. CULTURAL VALUES
To understand pollution control statutes, however, one can-
not refer simply to societal compassion or to the enforcement of
traditional rights. One must also consider cultural factors, es-
pecially the perceived social and natural boundaries that may
not be crossed and that determine the acceptability of risks.
1. Social and Natural Boundaries
On college campuses during the 1970s, Hans Bethe, the em-
inent nuclear physicist, and Barry Commoner, the environmen-
tal activist, debated issues involved in nuclear power and
pollution. In one debate,59 when Commoner spoke of the de-
pletion of natural resources, Bethe replied that there were no
natural resources but only raw materials. This distinction is
fundamental to understanding pollution control law.
60
59. The author describes here a debate he attended at Cornell University
in November, 1977.
60. The distinction is important more generally in applying environmen-
tal science to environmental law. Those who regard the environment in terms
of natural history think of function as following form and form as being deter-
mined by the past. Hence, biology should be committed to describing the es-
sences, taxa, or classes that evolution has produced and to understanding the
relations or "equilibria" among them. Those who think of nature in terms of
raw materials take a more "reductionist" approach. They argue that biologists
should investigate systems and mechanisms with a view to controlling and
manipulating them. These two approaches are found in various sciences, for
example, in psychology where Freudian and other therapeutic methodologies
contend with Skinnerian behaviorism. See R. RORTY, Method, Science, and So-
cial Hope, in CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 191, 197 (1982).
Consider the introduction of bioengineered organisms into the environ-
ment. Researchers at the University of Maryland propose to alter bass, floun-
der, and other species so that they can survive in today's bays and estuaries.
Klausner, University of Maryland Dives Into Biotechnology, in 2
BIo/TECHNOLOGY 212, 213 (1984) ("Planned projects include cloning genes
genes [sic] into striped bass and winter flounder to make these species survive
better in the Bay, developing different monoclonal antibodies against sea net-
tle toxins .... "). Those who regard nature and the environment in relation to
history are likely to oppose these introductions and to argue that we should
clean up the nation's waters, not alter species to make them able to survive in
degraded conditions. Those who see ecosystems simply as efficient producers
of economically useful materials, however, will argue that estuaries should be
understood as mechanisms not as historical artifacts. This latter group is
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For Bethe, things do not have essences or forms determin-
ing their function. Rather, cleverness in molding and manipu-
lating those things to meet needs determines what they are and
the value they may have. Technology is the key to cornucopia,
not the cause of catastrophe. Bethe might therefore regard na-
ture as having no organization and imposing no boundaries
other than those which are implied by the laws of chemistry
and physics.
Those who urge this view might argue that the compound
H20, in a given quantity with a given force and direction, might
serve as the basis of a biological system, as a liquid highway, or
as a sewer. The name "river" implies no particular function.
The way society traditionally divides nature into rivers, estua-
ries, meadows, forests, and farmland, according to this analysis,
is arbitrary. These boundaries are only accidents of natural his-
tory or artifacts of culture and convention, permeable to sci-
ence and technology.
For Commoner, on the other hand, natural objects come in
natural kinds; form determines function. If boundaries are
forced or crossed too often, as by an intrusive and reckless use
of technology, catastrophe will result.
To understand the difference between these two views, it is
useful to consider an analogy. Most homes are divided into var-
ious rooms, each with a particular form and function, such as
kitchens, bedrooms, and studies. A decorator of these rooms
keeps in mind boundaries, considered natural but largely con-
ventional: a place to eat, a place to sleep, and a place to study.
It is basic to our humanity, one might say, to have an image of
how our surroundings, natural and personal, are organized and
to conform our behavior to that image.
Similarly, nearly all societies have rules about how to greet
strangers, conduct marriages, bury the dead, and entertain
friends. Indeed, to have settled expectations in these matters-
to be able therefore to engage in expressive and not simply in
practical activity-is to have a culture and to be civilized.
Nothing in science distinguishes between civilian and mili-
tary dead, friends and strangers, or a chemical occurring natu-
rally and the same chemical put in the air by a corporation, yet
society makes these distinctions. Likewise, although pollution
control legislation relies on the knowledge and the techniques
of science and engineering, the purposes of these laws and the
likely to see bioengineering as improving the efficiency of natural systems and
not to worry about the "essences" or "authenticity" of species.
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goals they seek to achieve are not all definable in the mathe-
matical languages of science.
One of the great challenges of our time is the invitation
presented by various "reductionist" sciences to see ourselves
apart from history, culture, and the framework of beliefs upon
which people usually rely in evaluating social events. Accord-
ing to Mary Douglas:
This is the invitation to full self-consciousness that is offered in our
time. We must accept it. But we should do so knowing that the price
is William Burroughs' Naked Lunch. The day when everyone can see
exactly what it is on the end of everyone's fork, on that day there is
no pollution and no purity and nothing edible or inedible, credible or
incredible, because the classifications of social life are gone. There is
no more meaning.
61
Pollution control law requires the setting of standards, in-
sofar as possible, in precise mathematical and scientific terms.
Yet the differences between purity and pollution, the edible
and the inedible, the decent and the indecent, are paradigmati-
cally classifications of social life. The problem is not simply to
determine when science is or is not appropriate for assessing
and evaluating environmental concerns. The problem also is to
understand that science is many things-and that a careful,
sympathetic, and historical understanding of social values and
classifications can be scientific.62
2. Acceptability of Risks
Cultural factors strongly influence individuals' and soci-
ety's willingness to take risks. People tend to resent risks asso-
ciated with pollutants, food additives, pesticides, and other
products and by-products of economic activity; they more read-
ily accept many greater hazards for which there may be noth-
ing but nature to blame.63 The magnitude of a risk, the extent
of the harm divided by the probability of its occurrence, may be
less important than its meaning within a context of social, eco-
61. M. DOUGLAS, Environment at Risk, in IMPLICIT MEANINGS 230, 247
(1975) (footnote omitted).
62. See Dretske, Laws of Nature, 44 PHIL. OF Sci. 248 (1977); Glymour, So-
cial Science and Social Physics, 28 BEHAVIORAL SCI. 126 (1983); Hirschman,
The Search For Paradigms as a Hindrance to Understanding, in INTERPRETIVE
SOCIAL SCIENCE: A READER 163 (P. Rabinow & W. Sullivan eds. 1979); Rorty,
supra note 60; Scriven, Explanation and Prediction in Evolutionary Theory,
130 SCIENCE 477 (1959).
63. See Ames, Dietary Carcinogens and Anticarcinogens, 221 SCIENCE
1256 (1983) (compiling evidence that "naturally" occurring mutagens and car-
cinogens, which no one resents, are often far more dangerous than additives
which are illegal).
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nomic, and political relationships. 64
Society may perceive some hazards as more or less danger-
ous than they are because of the extent to which those hazards
incite resentment or fear.65 Some risks may be more acceptable
than others, in spite of "costs" and "benefits," if they are as-
sumed "voluntarily," if the outcome depends on our own skill
or care, if the harm occurs eventually rather than immediately,
or if the hazards are spread equitably over society as a whole.66
Much of the popular resentment of pollution may arise not
from a perception of risks and hazards, but from a deep cul-
tural aversion toward wastes and "unnatural" substances in
what people breathe, eat, and drink. To understand this aver-
sion, consider an example. One swallows one's own saliva all
the time, so it cannot be dangerous, yet no one would want to
drink a glassful of saliva kept chilled and sterile in the refriger-
ator. It does not contribute anything to say that spit is safe--or
to pronounce on the safety of some industrial soup poured into
a river-if people are disgusted by it rather than afraid of it.
Disgust can be as strong an emotion as fear, and it can bring
people together equally well to support policies to control
pollution.
The question arises how cultural, aesthetic, and symbolic
factors may properly be taken into account in setting pollution
standards. To an extent, current law does this by treating pol-
lution as taboo and calling for its elimination. The alterna-
tive-the invitation to "objective" and "value-free" analysis-
would be to regulate pollutants simply by assessing the magni-
tude and severity of the risks they pose, regardless of their so-
cial context, symbolic significance, cause, or source.
It is conceivable, however, that society's attitudes might be
64. Mary Douglas has developed a theory that the way societies think
about pollution helps to preserve relationships of power and status. See M.
DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER: AN ANALYSIS OF CONCEPTS OF POLLUTION
AND TABOO (1966). Elsewhere she writes:
Pollution is the black [sic] side of Plato's good lie on which society
must rest: it is the other half of the necessary confidence trick. We
should be able to see that we can never ask for a future society in
which we can only believe in real, scientifically proved pollution dan-
gers. We must talk threateningly about time, money, God and nature
if we hope to get anything done. We must believe in the limitations
and boundaries of nature which our community projects.
M. DOUGLAS, supra note 61, at 245-46 (footnote omitted).
65. See Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, Labile Valves: A Challenge for
Risk Assessmen4 in SOCIETY, TECHNOLOGY AND RISK ASSESSMENT 57 (J. Con-
rad ed. 1980).
66. See W. LOWRANCE, OF ACCEPTABLE RISK 75-101 (1976).
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understood and appreciated sufficiently to set priorities taking
into account the meaning as well as the magnitude of various
environmental hazards. NEPA seemed to express this hope by
directing all agencies of the federal government to "utilize a
systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the in-
tegrated use of the natural and social sciences ... in planning
and decisionmaking which may have an impact on man's envi-
ronment."6 7 No one has been able to explain, however, what
such an integrated, interdisciplinary approach might be like.
D. A SENSE OF COMMUNITY
The Declaration of Independence emphasizes communitar-
ian commitments68 as well as individual rights.69 American
political history similarly may be interpreted as an attempt to
forge a sense of national community while at the same time
protecting the ability of individuals to pursue their own concep-
tions of the good life and of the values that enter into that
life.70
Liberal political administrations in America, from Thomas
Jefferson to Franklin D. Roosevelt, have favored what has been
called the "national idea," that is, the idea of national unity in
pursuing public values and common ideals.71 Liberal political
theory of the type propounded by John Rawls does not rule out
such values and ideals, for example, by presupposing an eco-
nomic conception of the person, a psychology of "possessive in-
dividualism," or a preference-theory of the good.72 It requires
67. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102(A), 42 U.S.C. 4332(A)
(1982).
68. The Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776) ("When in the
Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people .... ") (emphasis
added); see also U.S. CONST. preamble ("We the people of the United States, in
order to form a more perfect Union .... ).
69. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("[A]ll men are
... endowed... with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.").
70. For such an interpretation of American political history, see, e.g., D.
MINAR, IDEAS AND PoLrrIcs: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 416 (1964) ("liber-
alism of all sorts [in America] is troubled by the seemingly contrary pulls of
responsibility to individual and community, by the divergent demands of abso-
lute adherence to the doctrine of individual integrity and the needs and poten-
tials of the common life").
71. Beer, Liberalism and the National Idea, 5 PUB. INTEREST 70, 74-76
(1966).
72. Some commentators have read Rawls and the liberal tradition gener-
ally as presupposing the philosophical doctrine that the soul exists apart from
or prior to its experiences, e.g., a view of the person as Economic Man "pos-
sessing" preferences. This reading is inaccurate and creates a straw man
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only that the common purposes and aspirations contemplated
by the laws be neutral among the various conceptions people
might have of themselves as persons, and the various beliefs to
which they may be committed in leading their personal lives.73
American patriotism is not founded on immemorial ties of
blood and history; nor does it depend ultimately on market re-
lationships or the idea of a commercial contract. The underly-
ing principle of American patriotism, as William Sullivan
observes, is "the notion of civic covenant."74 This "means that
as citizens we make an unlimited promise to show care and
concern to each other."75 The compassion that contributes to
the moral basis of pollution control law expresses a sense of
mutual trust that is basic to the American civic tradition. It is
which communitarians may criticize. See, e.g., A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE
(1981); M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); R. UNGER,
KNOWLEDGE AND PoLITICs (1975). For criticism of this "straw man" interpre-
tation of liberalism, see Gutmann, Communitarian Critics of Liberalism, 14
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 308 (1985); Sagoff, Book Review, 92 YALE L.J. 1065 (1982)
(reviewing M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITs OF JUSTICE (1982)).
73. Liberal political theory in America, the tradition that runs from
Thomas Jefferson to John Rawls, has not opposed nationalizing ideas and
communitarian goals but has only insisted that these collective efforts should
be as neutral as possible on what may be called the question of the good life.
See Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 113 (S. Hamp-
shire ed. 1978) (The liberal theory of equality "supposes that government must
be neutral on what might be called the question of the good life... that polit-
ical decisions must be, so far as is possible, independent of any particular con-
ception of the good life, or of what gives value to life."). Id at 127.
Jefferson urged the importance of ridding the law of any preference con-
cerning religion "to comprehend, within the mantle of its protection, the Jew
and the Gentile, the Christian and the Mahometan, the Hindoo, and Infidel of
every denomination." T. JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 67
(A. Lipscomb & A. Bergh eds. 1904).
Rawls has extended this exclusion to include not only religious views of
the soul but also philosophical conceptions of human nature and the meaning
of life. Rawls stresses that modern democratic societies have their origins in
social and historical conditions, e.g., "in the Wars of Religion following the
Reformation and the subsequent development of the principle of toleration
.... These conditions profoundly affect the requirements of a workable con-
ception of political justice: such a conception must allow for a diversity of doc-
trines and the plurality of conflicting, and indeed incommensurable,
conceptions of the good affirmed by the members of existing democratic socie-
ties." Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 223, 225 (1985). For a comparison between Jefferson (applying the princi-
ple of toleration to religious doctrines) and Rawls (applying the same principle
to philosophical doctrines and conceptions), see Rorty, The Priority of Democ-
racy over Philosophy (unpublished ms. available from the author, Richard
Rorty, University of Virginia).
74. W. SULLIVAN, RECONSTRUCTING PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 160 (1982).
75. Id, at 161.
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as familiar in American history as the pledge of loyalty that
concludes the Declaration of Independence. 76
The general goals of pollution control legislation, while ex-
pressing mutual trust and loyalty to a common heritage, are at
the same time completely consistent with the rights and liber-
ties of individuals. No one, after all, has the right to pollute.
The shared aspiration for a cleaner, safer, more "natural" envi-
ronment, like the national effort to land a man on the moon,
builds a national sense of patriotism and pride while remaining
utterly innocuous from the point of view of a liberal theory of
rights. Laws like the Clean Air Act reflect upon the nation's
self-respect and virtue while remaining completely neutral on
the question of the good life.
In showing respect and concern for one another and in pro-
tecting the environment, Americans find a unifying political
theme and become more than "an assemblage associated by a
common acknowledgement of law, and by a community of in-
terests," as Cicero described civil society.77 The body politic be-
comes as well a nation or a people, which is, in Augustine's
phrase, "an assemblage of reasonable beings bound together by
a common agreement as to the objects of their love."7 8
II. THE EFFICIENCY APPROACH TO POLLUTION
CONTROL LAW
Controversy concerning pollution control law begins when
one moves, "in Winston Churchill's phrase, 'from the wonder-
ful cloudland of aspiration to the ugly scaffolding of attempt
and achievement.' ",79 When one tries to set and enforce spe-
cific policy goals, moral intuitions that were clear about gener-
alities wobble with respect to the specifics, and one seeks more
technical and theoretical frameworks for help. In the past
twenty years, a group of academics, primarily policy analysts
and resource economists, has offered one such framework: the
efficiency approach. According to this approach, pollution con-
trol law should be a governmental effort to correct market fail-
ures to allocate scarce resources efficiently.8 0
76. The Declaration of Independence para. 32 (U.S. 1776) ("we mutually
pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor").
77. St. Augustine ascribes this view to Cicero. See AUGUSTINE, THE CITY
OF GOD 61-2 (M. Dods trans. 1950).
78. I& at 706.
79. Ruckelshaus, supra note 1, at 24.
80. Richard Musgrave recognized three principal reasons that justify gov-
ernmental intervention in the operation of markets. First, the government
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A. LETTING MARKETS DECIDE
According to Arthur Okun, the "concept of efficiency im-
plies that more is better, insofar as the 'more' consists of items
that people want to buy."8 1 Many who joined the environmen-
tal movement of the 1960s and 1970s, however, disputed this
claim and argued that less is better-that "an American life
style not based on material growth and consumption... would
be pleasant and rewarding."8 2 These environmentalists spoke
of "simplicity" and of the "earlier virtues of frugality, pru-
dence, and valuing of people over possessions."8' 3 Environmen-
talists argued further that the convictions and beliefs upon
which an environmental ethic is based are often incommensu-
rable with the wants and preferences that consumers pursue
and that, to a large extent, advertisers create.8 4
During the 1960s and 1970s, Congress, responding to the
environmental movement, enacted various pollution control
may legitimately transfer wealth to achieve greater equity in the distribution
of income. Second, it may engage in various macroeconomic policies to even
out business cycles, stabilize fluctuations, and otherwise promote prosperity
and economic growth. Finally, the government may seek to correct market
failures to increase economic efficiency in the allocation of resources. See R.
MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 5 (1959). Of these three goals,
which are still widely recognized in economic theory, the third appears most
relevant to pollution control law and environmental policy.
A few environmental factors, such as weather, are volatile enough to up-
set business cycles, e.g., in agriculture, but these natural fluctuations are gen-
erally not the concern of environmental legislation. While many important
ethical and cultural reasons for pollution control exist, none seems related in
any consistent way to improving equity in the distribution of income or
wealth. For discussion of the distributional aspects of pollution control policy,
see Krieger, Six Propositions on the Poor and Pollution, 1 POL'Y Sci. 311
(1970); Peskin, Environmental Policy and the Distribution of Benefits and
Costs, in CURRENT ISSUES IN U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 144 (P. Portney ed.
1978). For an argument that environmentalists are often the rich and the priv-
ileged attempting to protect their own backyards, see B. FRIEDEN, THE ENVI-
RONMENTAL PROTECTION HUSTLE (1979) and W. TUCKER, PROGRESS AND
PRIVILEGE (1982).
81. A. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF, 2 (1975).
82. A. Ehrlich & P. Ehrlich, The Beginning of a Better Future, in THE
NEW ENViRONMENTAL HANDBOOK, at 5, 5 (G. De Bell ed. 1980).
83. Id
84. See Elster, Sour Grapes-Utilitarianism and the Genesis of Wants, in
UTILITARIANISm AND BEYOND (A. Sen & B. Williams, eds. 1982) (arguing that
utilitarianism takes account of wants only as they are given, and fails to ade-
quately consider the genesis of wants); Goodin, Laundering Preferences, in
FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 87 (J. Elster & A. Hylland eds. 1986)
(arguing that in collective decisionmaking, people "express only a small subset
of their preferences in the form of political demands" and that social authori-
ties respond selectively to citizen preferences).
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laws which, as the first part of this Article suggests, were
founded on ethical considerations and were intended to prevent
harms and to protect rights. These laws generally refuse to
treat air and water simply as resources, like iron ore and petro-
leum, to be allocated by the market. Rather, these laws tend to
view "[e]ver growing pollution of the air and water" as "an evil
that [has] to be stopped."' 5
Somewhat at cross-purposes with the development of the
law, a major tradition of academic writing arose which ad-
dressed pollution control as a problem in allocating scarce re-
sources. This tradition puts the policy issue not in terms of
harms or rights, but in terms of correcting the failure of mar-
kets to allocate resources to those who are willing to pay the
most for their use.8 6
This economic approach to environmental policy rests on
an analogy between clean air and water on the one hand, and
any scarce resource, such as coal or timber, on the other. Soci-
ety has just so much air to allocate among various uses, so the
analogy goes, and the task of allocating it is like that of allocat-
ing any other scarce resource. This job of allocation is best
done by free, fair, and informed markets. Policy analysts tend
to assume that a principal reason markets are desirable is that
under certain conditions they allocate resources efficiently.
These analysts argue that the government should correct mar-
kets when they fail to make an efficient allocation.8 7
Although a strong consensus in the country favors using
markets to allocate resources, different political groups have
different reasons for joining in this consensus. Liberals tend to
85. Stewart, Economics, Environmen4 and the Limits of Legal Control, 9
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1985).
86. "In the economic vision, it is only the prospect of overcoming the mar-
ket's failure to capture gains from trade that can justify, from the individual's
standpoint, the risks of exploitation inherent in majoritarian political institu-
tions." Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with Ration-
ality Review? 13 CREIGHTON L. REv. 487, 498 (1979). He adds: "Would it not,
then, make economic sense to include in the [C]onstitution a direction to the
courts to nullify any majoritarian intervention which plainly cannot even
make a pretense of being a solution to a market-failure problem?" Id. at 498-
99. See also Michelman, Constitutions, Statutes, and the Theory of Efficient
Adjudication, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 431 (1980) (discussing the economic theory of
efficient adjudication in public law).
87. See, e.g., W. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS: THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL
POLLUTION 15-34 (1974). See also Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 2(b), 3 C.F.R. 127
(1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 at 431-34 (1982) ("[r]egulatory action shall
not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to society for the regulation
outweigh the potential costs to society").
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believe that markets are good because they are neutral among
preferences and are in that sense egalitarian.8 8 Conservatives
tend to believe that markets are good because they reward
traditional virtues, such as thrift and hard work, while punish-
ing vices like insobriety and indolence.8 9 Markets arguably pre-
serve autonomy and make individuals responsible for the
choices that affect them. Nearly everyone agrees that markets
are advantageous insofar as they are impersonal and relieve the
government of responsibility for the consequences of choices in-
dividuals make.90
If the analogy between clean air and water and other
scarce resources were accepted, many might agree that free and
fair markets provide the best way to allocate these resources
among those who compete for their use. A first step toward the
goal of letting the market decide might be to establish property
rights in air and water by routinely awarding injunctive relief
in nuisance cases. This would force corporations, before dispos-
ing of pollutants, to obtain the consent of those whose persons
and property might be damaged as a result. Corporate and
other polluters would either bargain with individuals to win
their consent to continue polluting or they would stop
polluting.
Economic analysts, however, generally do not recommend
letting markets function in this way. The analysts tend to con-
strue pollution not as an invasion of personal or property
rights, but as a paradigmatic "spillover" or market "external-
ity," or in other words, as an uncompensated third-party effect
of market transactions. Spillovers of this sort are unjust. It is
one thing when an individual agrees to pay a price for a benefit
he receives; it is another when a cost is simply imposed upon
him and the benefit goes to someone else.91
88. See Dworkin, supra note 73, at 130 (arguing that a market "may be ex-
pected to provide a more egalitarian division" of goods than some alternative
arrangement, given an equitable division of wealth).
89. See Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 103, 124 (1979) (arguing that competition "encourages and rewards the
traditional virtues ('Calvinist' or 'Protestant') and capacities associated with
economic progress").
90. For a good defense of markets as methods of collective choice, see C.
SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST (1977).
91. Pollution represents a market "failure" in the sense that personal and
property rights have not been protected. It is unclear how a market failure of
this kind can be corrected by any other means than that of granting injunctive
relief to protect those rights. A market failure of this sort cannot be corrected
by taxing polluters to "internalize" the cost of the "externality," because this
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Society could respond to this injustice in three different
ways. The first possible response is to simply allow one individ-
ual to make use of the person or property of another, without
that person's consent, provided this use is efficient overall or
the benefits to society as a whole outweigh the costs.92 The sec-
ond alternative is to let markets function by protecting prop-
erty rights, and by systematically giving plaintiffs injunctive
relief against polluters. This insistence on protecting property
rights is associated not with economic analysis but with the
political theory of libertarianism. 93 The third alternative is to
require, as much of our legislation does, polluters to make the
fastest progress that is economically and technologically feasi-
ble toward reducing and eventually eliminating their emissions.
The first approach is based on the idea that the way to deal
with pollution is to make sure it "pays its way," from the point
of view of society as a whole.9 4 If the private and social costs of
does not address the cause of the failure, namely, the protection of the right in
question.
92. Once we make the social pie as big as possible by maximizing overall
social wealth, we can compensate the victims or redistribute wealth in any way
that seems fair. This approach, to allocate resources efficiently and then redis-
tribute wealth equitably, is the approach policy analysts generally take. "Allo-
cation programs include measures to affect relative prices and/or the
allocation of resources in an economy, motivated by considerations of eco-
nomic efficiency. Distribution programs consist of efforts to alter the distribu-
tion of incomes in society, motivated by considerations of distributive equity."
E. GRAMLICH, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS 13 (1981).
These analysts generally argue that the two sorts of programs should be
kept separate, e.g., that fossil fuels should be allocated efficiently, then income
redistributed so that poor people can afford heat. See Schelling, Economic
Reasoning and the Ethics of Policy, 63 PUB. INTEREST 37, 57 (1981).
93. See supra note 56.
94. The notion that there is such a thing as a "point of view of society as a
whole" is not a tenet of liberal political theory but instead belongs to the com-
munitarian theories of the far right and far left. In supposing that there is
such a "point of view," contemporary "utilitarianism" adopts a communistic
fiction about the oneness of society as the unity of its interests. This theory, in
other words, assumes the existence of a common good, namely, the general
welfare, and then directs social policy toward achieving it. See G. MYRDAL,
THE POLITICAL ELEMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC THEORY 54
(1954).
Democratic political theory does not rely on this fiction of the unity of so-
ciety. It assumes that individuals pursue incompatible and even incommensu-
rable conceptions of the good but that they may form shifting majorities.
These majorities form from time to time to achieve common goals and aspira-
tions, which they determine and which are not set beforehand, for example, by
a theoretical vision (such as welfare or efficiency) of what the good is. In a
liberal democracy, the power of majorities to legislate common goals is se-
verely limited by the rights of individuals and minorities to protection from
the usual excesses of tyranny.
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production diverge,95 markets are then unable "to allocate envi-
ronmental resources efficiently-that is, to price their destruc-
tive use appropriately,196 from the point of view of the general
welfare, as economists understand that concept. The idea is
that corporations and others should not be allowed to pollute
unless they pay to compensate the victims of their pollution, or
at least pay what they can and yet still remain profitable.9 7
If Belcho, Inc., for example, is able to "externalize" some
of its production costs by casting its effluents upon the public,
forcing others to contain them, clean them up, or suffer losses,
it can undersell its competitor, Cleanco, which disposes of its ef-
fluents properly or compensates the victims of its effluents.
Companies like Belcho, therefore, will overproduce, and society
will overconsume their products, because the prices these com-
panies charge-private costs-need not reflect the full value to
society-social costs-of the resources used in production.
Companies like Cleanco, moreover, will underproduce their
widgets, which they must sell at a higher price. As a general
result, society will have many more Belcho products than it
wants relative to its desire for Cleanco's products, and for pure
water and air.
The second possible response to the inequities of pollu-
tion's "spillover" effects is to allow markets to function by pro-
tecting property rights in environmental assets and attributes.
In the 1960s, economists began to apply to environmental issues
the theory of market "externalities," which had been devel-
oped, at least in outline, about thirty years earlier.98 In 1969,
95. See supra notes 11 & 12 and accompanying text.
96. Kneese, Environmental Policy, in THE UNITED STATES IN THE 1980's
253, 259 (P. Duignan & A. Rabushka eds. 1980).
97. This is the Kaldor-Hicks compensation test for efficiency. Economists
generally argue that the problem with this test is that it does not require com-
pensation to be paid; it is, then, only a test of potential not actual Pareto im-
provement. See E.J. MISHAN, INTRODUCTION TO NORMATIVE ECONOMICS ch. 41
(1981). We shall argue here that there is another problem, namely, that by
setting up a compensation test, Kaldor-Hicks imagines property rights to be
backed only by a liability rule, and therefore takes them out of the market,
even if compensation is paid. The amount of compensation would not be set
(as it is in markets) by the price the seller actually demands, but by an "objec-
tive" price, presumably set by economists working as consultants.
98. The notion of an "external economy" or an uncompensated third-
party effect can be found in the literature of economics as early as 1898. See
A. MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICs 346-400 (4th ed. 1898). The external-
ity concept was apparently first applied to environmental disamenities by
Pigou, see A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 182-88 (4th ed. 1960).
Pigou also suggested a solution, namely, that the government place a tax on
effluents. Id- This tax would encourage companies to reduce their discharges
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two economists, Robert Ayres and Allen Kneese, argued that
the disposal of residuals will constitute a serious technological
external diseconomy unless "all inputs are fully converted into
outputs . . . and all final outputs are utterly destroyed in the
process of consumption, or ... property rights are so arranged
that all relevant environmental attributes are in private owner-
ship and these rights are exchanged in competitive markets." 99
To understand this recommendation, 0 0 it is necessary to
ask whether Kneese, Ayres, and like-minded resource econo-
mists believe that government should apply a property rule or a
liability rule in protecting privately-held entitlements to envi-
ronmental assets and attributes. There is an important differ-
ence. As Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed explain,
"[ain entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent
that someone who wishes to remove the entitlement from its
holder must buy it from him in a voluntary transaction in
which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the
seller."' 0 1 If Mr. Boomer, for example, had held an entitlement
backed by a property rule to enjoy his land free of Atlantic's
pollution, the court would have given him the injunction he
sought. Atlantic would have had to accommodate Boomer,
up to the point at which it is cheaper for them to pollute rather than to pay
the tax. The taxes they pay would then be passed on to the consumer, more-
over, making the private costs of products better reflect their social costs, in-
cluding the costs of pollution. For development of the concept that
unregulated markets will "fail to coincide with the requirements of an ideally
functioning market system" where pollution is concerned, see A. KNEESE,
WATER POLLUTION: ECONOMIC ASPECTS AND RESEARCH NEEDS 18-28, 28
(1962).
This analysis of the economic problem of pollution languished for about
thirty years until the 1960s, when economists, along with society as a whole,
became concerned about the environment. In 1966, Kenneth Boulding pointed
out that the planet is a closed system in which "the outputs of all parts... are
linked to the inputs of other parts." Boulding, The Economics of the Coming
Spaceship Earth, in ENviRONMENTAL QUALITY IN A GROWING ECONOMY 3 (H.
Jarrett ed. 1966). This paper focused attention on the idea that residuals, i.e.,
pollutants, do not disappear but instead must be properly managed.
99. Ayres & Kneese, Production, Consumption, and Externalities, 59 AM.
ECON. REV. 282, 283 (1969).
100. Kneese writes that if markets are competitive and open to all possible
claims, and participants in the market are fully informed, "the best social solu-
tion to the problem of allocating the society's scarce resources is to limit the
role of government to deciding questions of equity in income distribution, pro-
viding rules of property and exchange, enforcing competition, and allowing the
exchange of privately owned assets in markets to proceed freely." See Kneese,
supra note 96, at 257.
101. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inaliena-
bility: One View of the Cathedra 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1092 (1972).
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either by not polluting his property or by paying him the
amount he demanded. When an entitlement is backed by a
property rule, the buyer meets the seller's price.
With an entitlement protected by a liability rule, however,
the price is determined not by the seller but usually by a court
with the aid of expert testimony. Boomer was forced, in fact, to
accept an amount the court found to be equal to what his prop-
erty was "objectively" worth. "Whenever someone may destroy
the initial entitlement if he is willing to pay an objectively de-
termined value for it, an entitlement is protected by a liability
rule."'10 2 In this kind of a "market," the right-holder does not
have the choice of keeping his home or bodily safety rather
than going without it for a price. The buyer does not have to
pay the seller's price but a price determined by, for instance, an
agency of the state.
If Kneese and like-minded resource economists took free
markets and property rights seriously enough to let polluters
and pollutees strike their own bargains, rather than having the
government, by applying an interest-balancing or cost-benefit
test, impose bargains on them, the results would be foreseeable.
Plaintiffs from coast to coast would refuse to take payment for
damage to their person and property; they would go to court
and get injunctive relief. This is inferable first, from "the fact
that the great majority of nuisance suits have been in equity
and concerned primarily with the prevention of future
damage."103
Second, environmentalists constitute a strong ideological
faction in this country, and it is not difficult to imagine that
they will prefer an injunction to selling out to a polluter at any
price.'0 4 Third, surveys suggest that a majority of Americans
would refuse "being bought off to permit pollution," and thus
they would set a prohibitively high compensation value for
their right to be free of other people's wastes. 05
Finally, the history of urban redevelopment indicates that
102. Id.
103. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 87, at 576 (4th ed. 1971).
104. In a major national opinion survey conducted by Resources for the Fu-
ture, a nonprofit research organization, a plurality of respondents of the gen-
eral population answered affirmatively to a question asking whether
environmental protection is so important that "improvement must be made re-
gardless of costs." U.S. COUNCIL ON ENViRONMENTAL QUALrrY, PUBLIC OPIN-
ION ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 3 (1980).
105. A group of economists from the University of Wyoming asked respon-
dents to their survey how much they would demand in compensation (the
"CS" or compensation value) to permit power companies to pollute a pristine
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many people will refuse a money payment when they wish in-
stead to keep their way of life.10 6 When a person has to
purchase an entitlement, he is limited by his budget and there-
fore may not bid very much for it. When a person is asked to
sell that entitlement, however, the sky is the limit, because his
ability to receive money vastly exceeds his ability to pay.
0 7
These arguments lead to the conclusion that if all relevant
environmental attributes were fully owned by individuals and
freely exchanged in competitive markets, and if these entitle-
ments were backed by a property rule, polluters either would
have to eliminate their effluents entirely, or reduce them to
levels so insignificant that they arguably would not violate per-
sonal or property rights. In other words, if an efficient alloca-
tion of resources is any allocation reached by free, voluntary,
and informed exchanges in competitive markets, where prop-
erty rights are backed by property rules, no pollution is gener-
ally the efficient solution. This is roughly the same outcome as
that envisioned by the more aspirational of our federal pollu-
tion control laws.
area causing a loss of visibility simulated in photographs. These researchers
report:
The CS values... put the liability for maintaining visibility with the
power companies and presupposes [sic] that the power companies will
attempt to buy off the consumers rather than cleanse the air. If re-
spondents reject this concept of "being bought off to permit pollu-
tion," they might increase their compensation. Strategically,
respondents may give large or infinite valuations as an indication that
this concept is unacceptable. This is partially supported in that
slightly over one-half of the sample required infinite compensation or
refused to cooperate with the CS portion of the survey instrument.
Rowe, d'Arge, & Brookshire, An Experiment on the Economic Value of Visi-
bility, 7 J. ENvTL. ECON. & MGMT. 1, 9 (1980).
106. See, e.g., URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CoNTRovERsY (J.Q.
Wilson ed. 1966).
107. People are likely to demand much more to surrender possessions than
they would pay to acquire those possessions. One reason for this is hysteresis,
that is, the feeling that things we grow accustomed to and then lose are much
more valuable than things we have never had. "Men generally fix their affec-
tions more on what they are possess'd of, than on what they never enjoy'd:
For this reason, it wou'd be greater cruelty to dispossess a man of any thing,
than not to give it him." D. HumE, A TREATISE OF HuMAN NATURE 482 (L.A.
Selby-Bigge 2d ed. 1978). For a discussion of hysteresis, see R. HARDIN, COL-
LECTIvE AcTION 82-83 (1982).
While nothing is surprising about the gulfs which separate prices people
demand versus prices they would pay to acquire the same rights, economists
occasionally express surprise when their surveys reveal this disparity. See, e.g.,
Knetsch & Sinden, Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded: Experi-
mental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity in Measures of Value, 99 Q.J.
ECON. 507, 508 (1984).
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Those who take the economic approach, however, generally
do not advocate a policy of protecting property rights with a
property rule under which free, competitive markets can func-
tion to set the prices at which people are willing to accept the
harm and risk of harm that pollution imposes on them. In-
stead, proponents of the economic approach argue that it is bet-
ter to determine prices for environmental attributes and
personal safety not on the basis of how much people would ac-
tually demand to relinquish their entitlements, but on some
more "rational" or "objective" basis. Decisions should be based
on cost-benefit analyses, or on the kind of interest-balancing
techniques used by the Boomer court.105
The economic or cost-benefit approach to the allocation of
environmental resources, indeed, does not really have to con-
sider property rights at all. Economic analysis of this sort has
little if any conceptual relation to free markets in which the
buyer meets the seller's price. Rather, the analyst needs only
to compare how much people are willing to pay for a marginal
improvement in personal safety or environmental quality with
the amount it would cost polluters to provide that much im-
provement.'0 9 However rights are distributed-or even if there
are no rights and no free markets-standards, policies, and de-
cisions that pass the cost-benefit test are deemed "efficient."' "
Free markets are defensible for various reasons, insofar as
they are voluntary, autonomous, neutral, and they reward vir-
tue and punish vice. If markets are to function, government
must protect personal and property rights by enjoining viola-
108. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 257
N.E.2d 870 (1970).
109. "In principle, the ultimate measure of environmental quality is the
value that people place on these ... services or their willingness to pay." A.
FREEMAN, R. HAVEMAN, & A. KNEESE, supra note 12, at 23.
110. It is a commonplace criticism that the efficiency norm is meaningless
because it is ambiguous between "bid" and "asked" prices. The efficiency ap-
proach depends necessarily on the Coasian view that when parties trade to an
equilibrium, the same substantive allocation of resources will result, regardless
of how property rights are distributed (or who is liable to whom), as long as
there are no transaction costs. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cos; 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 2-8 (1960). This theorem will not hold, however, unless individuals
are willing to sell or are willing to pay roughly the same amounts for the same
resources under different circumstances. Because individuals do not behave in
this manner, notions of economic optimality or efficiency are meaningless
since they are ambiguous between prices bid and asked. For this criticism, see
Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase
Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669, 678 (1979); Baker, The Ideology of the Eco-
nomic Analysis of Law, 5 PHL. & PuB. AFF. 3, 13 (1975).
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tions of those rights. If individuals could get systematic injunc-
tive relief against every polluter, however, a great deal of
important economic activity might come to a halt. If this is a
prohibitively expensive price to pay, only two alternatives for
forming environmental policy remain.
The first alternative is to implement legislation, to the ex-
tent economically practicable, to move incrementally toward
reducing or eliminating pollution. This approach, by respond-
ing to pollution in terms of the violation of personal and prop-
erty rights, remains in touch with the ideals of autonomy and
freedom that are often cited as the moral basis of markets. Ac-
cordingly, these laws appear justifiable even if one assumes
that clean air and water are analogous to other scarce
resources.
The second remaining alternative is to allocate air and
water resources "efficiently," i.e., to those who are willing to
pay the most for their use. This approach, which seeks to maxi-
mize consumer surplus, virtual profit, social wealth, potential
Pareto improvement, or some such notion theoreticians under-
stand, has no obvious relation to values, such as freedom and
autonomy, that make markets attractive institutions of collec-
tive choice.1 1'
A centralized or planned economy run by cost-benefit ana-
lysts might succeed better than a free economy if our concern is
with an end state (i.e., allocatory efficiency) rather than with a
fair procedure (i.e., equitable markets). Markets generally are
valued for procedural reasons, in that they are voluntary, au-
111. The objection here is not the one described in the previous footnote.
Rather, it is to point out that the arguments in favor of markets are not neces-
sarily arguments in favor of efficiency. To think otherwise is to be taken in by
the fallacious argument which runs this way: 1) informed, competitive mar-
kets are desirable methods of collective choice; 2) informed, competitive mar-
kets allocate resources efficiently; 3) cost-benefit analysis allocates resources
efficiently; therefore 4) cost-benefit analysis is a desirable method of collective
choice. The argument is fallacious because it assumes enthymematically that
the reason markets are desirable methods of collective choice is that they allo-
cate resources efficiently. This assumption is false.
Another fallacy, that of the illicit minor, is involved in this argument: 1)
markets which are competitive, etc., are desirable; 2) markets which are com-
petitive, etc., allocate resources efficiently; therefore 3) allocating resources ef-
ficiently is desirable. Compare: 1) beautiful rivers are good; 2) beautiful rivers
occasionally drown people; therefore 3) occasional drownings are good.
The fallacy in this argument is obvious because we know that drowning
people is not a reason rivers are good. We should also be aware that, absent an
independent normative basis for allocative efficiency, we cannot say that mar-
kets are good because they allocate resources efficiently.
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tonomous, impersonal, and neutral. Cost-benefit analysts value
their approach, on the other hand, because it results in efficient
allocation. It is a mistake, however, to move from the premise
that markets, under theoretical conditions, will allocate re-
sources efficiently, to the conclusion that any method of achiev-
ing the same allocation has the same virtues as markets.1 2
Nevertheless, other reasons, having nothing to do with the
freedom, impersonality, and neutrality of markets, may provide
a normative basis for the efficiency criterion in environmental
policy. For example, efficient allocation of resources might pro-
mote the welfare, happiness, or prosperity of society. If the ef-
ficiency criterion is defensible on any of these grounds, a case
might be made for markets because they allocate resources effi-
ciently, rather than arguing vainly for efficiency because of
some relation it is supposed to have with markets.
B. THE ETHICAL BAsIs OF EFFICIENCY
All other things being equal, one could contend that a
more efficient allocation of resources is better than a less effi-
cient one.113 The notion of "better," however, has no meaning
in this context.
1. Efficiency and Utilitarianism
If the efficiency criterion had a normative basis in the ethi-
cal theory of utilitarianism, it would have a demonstrable con-
nection with happiness or a related normative conception of the
good, and it would judge the value of actions and decisions ac-
cording to their consequences. The efficiency criterion and the
theory of welfare economics from which it is developed possess
112. For an argument against the cost-benefit approach because of its pro-
cedural properties (e.g., it is dictatorial), see Cuyler, The Quality of Life and
the Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, in PUBLIC ECONOMICS AND THE QUALITY
OF LIFE 141 (L. Wingo & A. Evans eds. 1977).
113. A sophisticated defense of preference-satisfaction as a basis for both
common law and social policy may be found in R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF
JUSTICE (1981). Posner defines the "wealth of society" as "the aggregate satis-
faction of those preferences (the only ones that have ethical weight in a sys-
tem of wealth maximization) that are backed up by money, that is, that are
registered in a market." I.& at 61.
For a good introduction to the concepts of efficiency, welfare, wealth,
Pareto optimality, and potential Pareto improvement, see Coleman, Economics
and the Law: A Critical Review of the Foundations of the Economic Approach
to Law, 94 ETHCS 649 (1984) and articles cited therein; Michelman, Norms and
Normativity in the Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1015, 1019-21,
1032-34 (1978).
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neither of these attributes, however, and they therefore have
no justification in the ethical theory of utilitarianism.
Sophisticated economic analysts do not try to connect the
efficiency norm with the classical utilitarianism of Bentham,
Mill, and Sidgwick, or with the goal of maximizing pleasure or
happiness that those philosophers proposed.114 As Richard Pos-
ner correctly points out, "[t]he most important thing to bear in
mind about the concept of value [in the welfare economist's
sense] is that it is based on what people are willing to pay for
something rather than the happiness they would derive from
having it."'15
Some policy analysts, however, believe that the satisfaction
of consumer and other personal preferences has a moral foun-
dation as a policy goal because it leads to or produces satisfac-
tion in the sense of pleasure or happiness. 116 This belief rests
on nothing more than a pun on the word "satisfaction." Prefer-
ences are satisfied in the sense of "met" or "fulfilled"; this is
also the sense in which conditions and equations are satisfied.
"Satisfaction" of this sort has no necessary connection with
"satisfaction" in the sense of pleasure or happiness.
The evidence indicates, in fact, that the satisfaction of pref-
erences does not promote or cause satisfaction in the sense of
happiness.1 17 Empirical research confirms what ordinary wis-
114. Sidgwick defines the value to be maximized not as consumer surplus
but as "the greatest possible surplus of pleasure over pain." H. SIDGwIcK, THE
METHODS OF ETHICS 412 (7th ed. 1907). No connection between these two con-
cepts, conceptual or empirical, has ever been demonstrated.
For a standard account of the utilitarian basis of welfare economics, see,
e.g., I.M.D. LITTLE, A CRITIQUE OF WELFARE ECONOMICS 42 (2d ed. 1957); A.C.
PIGOU, supra note 98, at 20.
115. Posner, supra note 113, at 60. Posner is aware of the familiar objec-
tions against utilitarianism as an ethical theory. He believes reasonably that
"normative" or welfare economics would benefit if it were not founded on
classical utilitarianism. Posner, therefore, proposes economic analysis not as a
consequence of utilitarianism but as an alternative basis for ethical theory. I&.
at 48.
116. William Baxter writes:
The first and most fundamental step toward solution of our envi-
ronmental problems is a clear recognition that our objective is not
pure air or water but rather some optimal state of pollution. That
step immediately suggests the question: How do we define and attain
the level of pollution that will yield the maximum possible amount of
human satisfaction?
Baxter, supra note 87, at 8-9.
117. That efficiency, wealth, potential Pareto improvement, and the like,
do not lead to happiness but, if anything, to its opposite, is the burden of a
number of important studies. See, e.g., F. HIRSCH, THE SoCIAL LIMITS TO
GROWTH (1976); A.0. HmSCMAN, SHIFTING INVOLVEMENTS: PRIVATE INTER-
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dom suggests: happiness depends more on the quality and pur-
suit of preferences than on the degree to which they are
satisfied.1 18
It is useful to recognize, moreover, that the contemporary
"utilitarianism" represented by current welfare economic the-
ory is not concerned with what happens to people as a result of
their choices. Instead, it is concerned with the beliefs and ex-
pectations revealed in those choices. The focus is on the
amount people are willing to pay for things rather than on the
consequences of those decisions, except insofar as these conse-
quences are defined tautologically in terms of willingness to
pay.
Whereas economists thus evaluate actions according to the
preferences people reveal when they act, ethical utilitarians
judge the value of actions according to their consequences.
Thus, utilitarians, to prevent what were unconscionable levels
of death and injury, have supported humanitarian legislation to
improve unsafe conditions in the nation's mills and mines. Hu-
manitarian legislation of this kind cannot be justified on an ex-
pected utility basis, however, for whenever workers voluntarily
and knowingly take unsafe jobs, which they often do,' 19 the
market operates efficiently to that extent, even if they all die
EST AND PUBLC ACTION (1982); T. ScITOvsKY, THE JOYLESS ECONOMY (1976).
For surveys and other empirical evidence that people do not become happier
when they have more of the things they want to buy (but instead are frus-
trated by rising expectations or dissatisfied by those things) see A. CAMPBELL,
P. CONVERSE, & W. RODGERS, THE QUALITY OF AMERICAN LIFE: PERCEPTIONS,
EVALUATIONS, AND SATISFACTIONS (1976), and Erskine, The Polls: Some
Thoughts About Life and People, 28 PUB. OPINION Q. 517 (1964). These studies
confirm the old saw of common wisdom that the way to achieve happiness is to
overcome desires rather than to satisfy them.
118. It is possible that the satisfaction of preferences leads often to frustra-
tion and disillusionment (as divorce statistics suggest) while the attempt to sat-
isfy desires, as long as they remain unfulfilled, is satisfying. See J. Keats, Ode
on a Grecian Urn, in COMPLETE POEMS AND SELECTED LETTERS 352 (C.
Thorpe ed. 1935).
119. For documentation of hazards in the workplace, see C. GERSUNY,
WORK HAZARDS AND INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT (1981). For example, fatalities
among railroad workers reached 28 per 10,000 per year in 1904 and in 1916 one
in ten were seriously injured. Id- at 20. "War is safe compared to railroading in
this country," said one railroad worker early this century. I.k See also W.K.
Viscusi, RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATORY HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE WORK-
PLACE 76-77 (1983) ("The widespread evidence that the market does provide
risk premiums suggests that workers are quite aware of job hazards."); L.
WHITE, HUMAN DEBRIS: THE INJURED WORKER IN AMERICA (1983) (docu-
menting the lives of injured workers and discussing the problems of industrial
injury, disease, and workers' compensation).
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as a result.120 The efficiency norm in public policy has no con-
nection, other than a historical one, with the ethical theory of
utilitarianism. To think otherwise is to confuse the satisfaction
of preference, which many economists favor, with the utilita-
rian's preference for satisfaction.
2. Satisfaction of Personal Preferences
Conceding that utilitarianism does not provide a normative
basis for the efficiency criterion, resource economists generally
attempt to support their position by referring to a central value
premise. "The value premise is that the personal wants of the
individuals in the society should guide the use of resources in
production, distribution, and exchange, and those personal
wants can most efficiently be met through the seeking of maxi-
mum profits by all producers."' 2 1
Such assertions, however, provoke one to ask why individu-
als' personal wants should guide-indeed, along with equity
considerations, determine-the government's natural resources
management policy. Although an individual's preference may
give him a reason to try to satisfy that preference, it does not
necessarily follow that the government has a reason to try to
satisfy that preference. To the contrary, the government in
many instances strives to keep people from satisfying their
preferences, as evidenced by laws prohibiting narcotics, prosti-
tution, and gambling. The question thus remains why it should
120. Kip Viscusi, recognizing that workers are generally aware of the ex-
tent of the hazards they face, argues that humanitarian workplace legislation,
"[w]hile perhaps well intended... will necessarily reduce the welfare of the
poorer workers in society, as perceived by them." W.K. VISCUSI, supra note
119, at 80. The welfare of workers "as perceived by them" refers to their ex-
pected utility which is determined entirely by their willingness to take the
risky job at a particular wage. This kind of "welfare" or "utility" remains the
same no matter what actually happens to these workers. For example, it re-
mains the same if they all die hideous deaths. This kind of "utility," since it is
determined independently of consequences, has nothing to do with utilitarian
ethics.
Thomas Schelling falsely claims that "economic theory evaluates actions
by their consequences and by the way the consequences are valued by the peo-
ple who benefit or suffer." Schelling, Prices as Regulatory Instruments, in IN-
CENTIVES FOR ENViRONMENTAL PROTECTION 3 (T.C. Schelling ed. 1983).
121. A. KNEESE & B. BOWER, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND RESIDUALS
MANAGEMENT 4-5 (1979). This value premise is related to a free market econ-
omy only if we assume that corporate executives are concerned with maximiz-
ing long-run profits rather than, e.g., promoting their own short-term personal
interests. Were the latter true, a centralized, planned economy, e.g., a socialist
one, that makes use of cost-benefit analysis, might conform to the value prem-
ise better than a capitalist one.
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be the government's policy to satisfy personal preferences with-
out regard to the values these preferences express. 22
In posing this question, one may assume that the govern-
ment generally should not interfere with the efforts citizens
make to satisfy their own preferences, except insofar as neces-
sary to protect the rights or freedoms of others. One may
agree, moreover, that the government should guarantee citizens
the background conditions of freedom and equality necessary
for those citizens to have a fair basis on which to form their
personal wants and to compete to satisfy those wants. Free-
dom, equality of opportunity, autonomy, and neutrality are all
important values and the government ought to protect them.
No one has yet explained, however, why efficiency in the allo-
cation of resources is a value, or why the satisfaction of per-
sonal preferences per se should be recognized as a goal of public
policy. 23
Environmental law as it stands is based on impersonal val-
ues chosen by the community through the political process.
These values have survived a process of public deliberation and,
on the merits, have gained the respect of at least a majority of
the legislature. In the political process, partisans offer to sup-
port their positions with reasons they suppose to be publicly or
intersubjectively valid for impersonal or public values. 124 These
values, at least formally, address not what I want but rather
what we should do; they take the community in general as their
logical subject.125
122. Those who believe that preference-satisfaction should be a goal of
public policy are faced with the problem of ugly preferences, e.g., those that
are racist, vicious, self-destructive, adaptive to circumstances beyond the
agent's control, or simply stupid. To save the general policy goal, analysts
have to invent ad hoc reasons for discounting or dismissing these various kinds
of preferences which plainly do not merit societal respect. For discussion, see
Elster, supra note 84, at 219; Goodin, supra note 84, at 75.
123. For additional discussion of this question, see Dworkin, Is Wealth a
Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 194 (1980); Dworkin, Why Efficiency? A Re-
sponse to Professors Calabresi and Posner, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563, 563 (1980).
124. People should debate public policy in public terms, that is, from the
point of view of what we stand for, desire or believe in as a community, not
from the point of view of personal wants or preferences. As is evident in the
now famous remark of former General Motors head Charles Wilson that
what's good for General Motors is good for the country, even he recognized
that public policy must be discussed in public terms, however self-serving the
motivation. See E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEN1SOVEREIGN PEOPLE 27 (1960).
125. Kant argued that in making a moral judgment, the individual legis-
lates for all, that is, she expresses a view about what any rational being would
do in similar circumstances. See I. KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS
OF MORALS 14 (J. Ellington trans. 1980). In environmental policy, we must
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Such values are logically different from personal prefer-
ences, which express only how the individual wants to live his
own life, about which liberals believe the government should be
as neutral as possible.1 6 Why should environmental policy
strive to satisfy personal preferences rather than respond to
these public values?2 7
Some might reply that the government ought to try to sat-
isfy personal preferences because this is what the people who
have those preferences want. This reply would start an infinite
regress if it were true. It is, however, mistaken. People want
their preferences satisfied at the moment they have them, but
they constantly reevaluate and revise their preferences. Over
the long run, people may regret that many preferences were
satisfied or be grateful that others were not. Besides, even if
people want their preferences satisfied at the moment they
have them, it by no means follows that they wish the govern-
ment to adopt preference-satisfaction as a major policy objec-
consider the relevant community to be the nation; law then respects the views
individuals defend concerning what we, as a nation, ought to do. This is differ-
ent from the wants or preferences the individual has for himself and may re-
veal in markets. For a good discussion of these distinctions in their Kantian
context, see W. SELLARS, SCIENCE AND METAPHYSICS: VARIATIONS ON KANTIAN
THEMEs ch. 7 (1968).
126. For one version of the distinction between personal and impersonal
preferences, see Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare, 10
PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 185 (1981). For example, Dworkin states:
[People have what I shall call impersonal preferences, which are
preferences about things other than their own or other people's lives
or situations. Some people care very much about the advance of sci-
entific knowledge, for example, even though it will not be they (or
any person they know) who make the advance, while others care
deeply about the conservation of certain kinds of beauty they will
never see.
Id. at 192.
Dworkin is correct here in distinguishing environmental values from per-
sonal (i.e., self-regarding) preferences and from distributional considerations.
To view all values as either personal preferences or distributional norms is to
exclude the community-based or public values on which much of our environ-
mental legislation rests. Community-based values are consistent with a liberal
theory of legislation because they concern conceptions of the good society
rather than conceptions of the good life, about which liberal policy is to be
neutral. See also Dworkin, Neutrality, Equality, and Liberalism in LIBER-
ALISM RECONSIDERED 1, 8 (D. MacLean & C. Mills eds. 1983) (distinguishing
between passive and active membership in a community).
127. There is a plethora of literature on the distinction between personal
(self-regarding) preferences and public (group-regarding) values. See, e.g.,
Maass, Benefit-Cost Analysis: Its Relevance to Public Investment Decisions, 80
Q.J. ECON. 208, 216-17 (1966); Marglin, The Social Rate of Discount and the Op-
timal Rate of Investment, 77 Q.J. ECON. 95, 98 (1963).
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tive. On the contrary, this goal has achieved credibility with
hardly anyone beyond the academics who invented it. 128
The ultimate question is why it should be a value premise
"that the personal wants of the individuals in the society should
guide the use of resources ... ,,129 Markets are supposed to
satisfy these personal preferences, and the government should
guarantee individuals the liberty to pursue the satisfaction of
their wants under conditions that are neutral among them and
fair to all. The question why the government itself should try
to satisfy these preferences, however, remains to be answered.
3. Welfare Maximization
Some might reply that the government should try to maxi-
mize the satisfaction of personal wants and preferences because
this will increase the welfare or utility of those who possess
those preferences. This reply, however, states a definition, not
a fact.
The concepts of "welfare" and "utility," as policy analysts
use them, are simply defined in terms of the satisfaction of
preferences.130 Thus, such an analyst might say that govern-
ment should strive to maximize the satisfaction of personal
preferences on a willingness-to-pay basis because this will in-
crease overall social welfare or utility. Government should in-
crease overall social welfare or utility, such reasoning
continues, to maximize the satisfaction of personal preferences
on a willingness-to-pay basis over society as a whole.
The same circular reasoning affects "normative" argu-
ments for efficiency as a goal of public policy. Why maximize
efficiency? Because this maximizes the satisfaction of prefer-
ences. Why maximize the satisfaction of preferences? Because
this, in turn, maximizes welfare. Why maximize welfare? To
128. See S. KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCENTIVEs? ECONOMISTS AND THE ENVI-
RONMENT ch. 3 (1981).
129. KNEESE & BOWER, supra note 121, at 4.
130. The underlying Paretian standard holds that a move from state A to
state B increases social welfare or utility if at least one person prefers B to A
and no one prefers A to B. This standard is generalized to more complex cases
by the Kaldor-Hicks principle which holds that A's social welfare is increased
if those who prefer B can compensate those who want A and still maintain
their preference. Thus the notion of social welfare or overall utility is defined
strictly in terms of satisfaction of preferences insofar as these preferences are
measured in terms of willingness to pay. It has no independent, normative sig-
nificance. For a clear discussion of these concepts in relation to current regu-
latory concerns, see Coleman, supra note 113, at 649.
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allocate resources efficiently. And so there is a perfect circle
on earth as there is in heaven.
Those who favor the efficiency norm in public policy often
make the point that "not just one but both parties to an ex-
change are better off after the exchange is executed than they
were before."1 31 What this means is that the expected utility of
both parties is increased. This, again, is tautologically true, be-
cause this kind of utility is inferred as a logical consequence
from the willingness of the parties to enter into the exchange.
To break out of this circle, analysts must explain how satisfying
preferences, and thus how allocating resources efficiently,
makes people better off in some normative, non-tautological
sense. This has never been done.132
4. Economic Prosperity
According to two observers, "[t]he primary justification the
Reagan administration gave for ... regulatory relief was that
regulation was one of the principal factors responsible for the
nation's poor economic performance during the 1970s."' 3 3 The
social costs of pollution control, however, are easily exag-
gerated. The efficiency norm in pollution control legislation,
moreover, cannot be justified on the ground that
microeconomic efficiency is related to the important normative
goal of economic prosperity.
Speculations on the amount that governmental regulations
"cost" society, of course, are part of political campaigning. In
1975, for example, President Ford, speaking in New Hampshire,
declared that "some estimates that I have seen place the com-
bined cost to consumers of Government regulation and restric-
131. Baxter, supra note 87, at 19.
132. Contemporary economic theory assumes that if a preference of any in-
dividual is satisfied, that individual and society as a whole is "better off" as a
result. This, indeed, is the basis of the concept of a Pareto improvement-a
change in social state that at least one person prefers and no one opposes.
This is not an improvement in any normative sense. It is an improvement, if
at all, from that individual's point of view. There is no "point of view of soci-
ety as a whole" from which it can be viewed as a social improvement.
Gunnar Myrdal observed in 1953 that contemporary "utilitarianism" re-
sembles communism in presupposing a "harmony of interests" and tends "to
be forced into an untenable 'communistic fiction' about the unity of society."
G. MYRDAL, supra note 94, at 54. This fiction amounts to the assertion that
society can be conceived as a single subject capable of having a single interest,
called the general welfare or the common good, and consenting as one person
to the policies that serve that interest. Id. at 194-95.
133. G. EADS & M. FIx, RELIEF OR REFORM? REAGAN'S REGULATORY DI-
LEMMA 17 (1984).
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tive practices, in the private sector at more than the Federal
Government actually collects in personal income taxes each
year-or something on the order of $2,000 per family-unbe-
lievable."'1 34 In the same year, the President's Council of Eco-
nomic Advisors announced that "[p]recise estimates of the total
costs of regulation are not available, but existing evidence sug-
gests that this may range up to 1 percent of gross national prod-
uct, or approximately $66 per person per year.' '135 And when
the Reagan administration took office, one of its principal eco-
nomic advisors, Murray Wiedenbaum, estimated the then cur-
rent social cost of governmental regulation, without regard to
the benefits, at $100 billion per year.136
Serious attempts to estimate the social costs of pollution
control regulation, again without regard to the benefits, during
the period between 1972 and 1980, were conducted by Chase
Econometric Associates (Chase) 37 and Data Resources Incorpo-
rated (DRI).138 These studies "are in agreement as to the ap-
parent size of the impacts of pollution control," namely that the
cost of pollution control contributes between 0.2 and 0.6 percent
to the inflation rate. 39 Both the Chase and the DRI studies
"find the direct price, output, employment, and other
macroeconomic effects of pollution control to be relatively
small."140
The results of a 1976 Weidenbaum and DeFina study ap-
pear to be roughly consistent with these earlier studies. 141
Weidenbaum's famous $100 billion estimate of the annual cost
134. White House Conference on Domestic and Economic Affairs: The
President's Remarks at the Conference in Concord, New Hampshire, 11
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 404 (Apr. 25, 1975). The President stated that
"[e]ven if the real costs are only a fraction of this amount, this is an intolerable
burden on our pocketbooks." Ia-
135. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT TRANSMITTED TO CONGRESS
FEBRUARY 1975, at 159 (1975).
136. Weidenbaum, On Estimating Regulatory Costs, REGULATION, May-
June 1978, at 14, 17.
137. For a detailed analysis of the 1976 Chase study, see Haveman & Smith,
Investment, Inflation, Unemployment, and the Environment, in CURRENT IS-
SUES IN U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 164, 175 (P. Portney ed. 1978).
138. DATA RESOURCES, INC., THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACT OF FEDERAL
POLLUTION CONTROL PROGRAMS: 1978 ASSESSMENT (Jan. 29, 1979) (report sub-
mitted to the Environmental Protection Agency and the Council on Environ-
mental Quality).
139. Portney, The Macroeconomic Impacts of Federal Environmental Regu-
lation, in ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND THE U.S. ECONOMY 25,47 (H. Pes-
kin, P. Portnoy, & A. Kneese eds. 1981).
140. Id. at 47.
141. M. WEIDENBAUM & R. DEFNA, THE COST OF FEDERAL REGULATION OF
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of federal regulation in 1976 covers not simply pollution control
but most major areas of regulation, including consumer, work-
place, energy, and financial regulation.142 For regulation of
"energy and the environment," Weidenbaum and DeFina esti-
mated administrative costs in 1976 at $612 million and compli-
ance costs at $7.7 billion.143 The 1976 total represents a cost of
roughly $307 per American.'4 Total regulatory costs in 1979,
on Weidenbaum's estimate, moreover, would come to $66 bil-
lion, not $100 billion.14 5  Of this total regulatory cost,
paperwork costs accounted for approximately 40 percent.146
The EPA and the Council for Environmental Quality have
sponsored studies of regulatory impact based on large-scale
macroeconomic models.147 The results of these studies are gen-
erally consistent with a study published by the Conservation
Foundation in 1982.148 This latter study found that pollution
control programs, which are labor-intensive, decreased the
GNP by a modest 0.2 percent, but also decreased unemploy-
ment by 0.3 percent.14 9 Eads and Fix caution that
[t]hese large-scale macroeconomic simulations tell us either that regu-
lation has relatively little impact on the variables that most econo-
mists watch as indicators of the health of the economy or that large-
scale macromodels are not sensitive enough to reliably indicate the
impact of such complex phenomena as a mass of individual programs
that, when lumped together, might be called "regulation."
1 50
ECONOMIC AcTIvrrY (The American Enterprise Institute Reprint No. 88, May,
1978).
142. Id. at 2.
143. Id.
144. Id at 3.
145. The familiar $100 billion figure is reached by an odd method.
Weidenbaum notes that administrative costs would increase in 1979 from the
1976 figure and that, in 1976, the ratio between administrative and compliance
costs ran roughly 20 to 1. "With administrative costs estimated at 4.8 billion,
the estimated total costs of federal regulation would exceed $100 billion."
Weidenbaum, supra note 136, at 17.
146. In their 1976 study, Weidenbaum and DeFina rely on figures gener-
ated by a senate subcommittee which had studied paperwork costs in 1972.
Weidenbaum & DeFina, supra note 141, at 29. They adjusted the figure to $25
billion in 1976 dollars. Id. at 2. This figure suggests that society could save a
lot more money by controlling and reducing paperwork than it might gain by
cutting back on programs to control pollution. For a discussion of this and
other aspects of the Weidenbaum study, see EADS & FIX, supra note 133, at 28-
31.
147. For a discussion of these studies, see Portney, supra note 139, at 39.
148. THE CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, THE STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN
1982: A REPORT FROM THE CONSERVATION FOUNDATION (1982).
149. Id at 35.
150. EADS & FIx, supra note 133, at 41.
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It is important also to note the theoretical relationship be-
tween allocative efficiency, a microeconomic concept, and vari-
ous desirable macroeconomic goals, such as growth and
prosperity. In general, economists recognize that macro-
economic problems have macroeconomic causes and solu-
tions.151 Economists understand that there is no clear or
straightforward relation between microeconomic efficiency and
macroeconomic performance. 152
Policy analysts, therefore, generally have not urged pros-
perity, economic growth, or any such macroeconomic goal as a
justification for a cost-benefit approach to public policy. This is
to their credit. For example, Edward Gramlich, in his basic
text on cost-benefit analysis and government programs, ac-
knowledges that "benefit-cost analyses of individual projects
will for the most part not involve macroeconomic questions."'1 5 3
5. Community Consent
The final argument supporting efficiency as a goal or crite-
rion in pollution control policy is based not on ethical but polit-
ical theory. Some analysts, recognizing that the efficiency
norm in public policy has no basis in utilitarianism, argue that
normative support may be found in the "hypothetical" or
"counterfactual" consent of the community. Richard Posner,
151. There are two prominent exceptions to this general rule. First, "sup-
ply-side" economists, frustrated by the apparent failure of Keynesian demand
management to keep down inflation and the apparent failure of monetary pol-
icy with respect to unemployment, have argued that microeconomic inefficien-
cies prevent full employment and maximum productivity. The supply-side
argument does not attract many mainstream Ph.D. economists, but it has
achieved a good deal of political attention, especially as formulated by George
Gilder, who had no formal training in economics. G. GILDER, WEALTH AND
POVERTY (1981).
Second, "rational expectations" economists also tie macroeconomic per-
formance to microeconomic efficiency, but unlike the supply-siders, these
economists believe that markets quickly discount governmental policies, which
therefore make little difference. The government therefore cannot really im-
prove matters by monetary or other policy; indeed, rational expectationists see
poor economic performance as caused by random shocks, mistakes, and fail-
ures of information which cannot be controlled. For a survey, see
Schoemaker, The Expected Utility Modek Its Variants, Purposes, Evidence
and Limitations, 20 J. ECON. LIT. 529 (1982).
For a good assessment of these two schools, see L. THUROW, DANGEROUS
CURRENTS: THE STATE OF ECONOMICS chs. 5, 6 (1983).
152. For a good collection of papers making this point, see MICROECONOMIC
EFFICIENCY AND MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (D. Shepherd, J. Turk, & A.
Silberston eds. 1983).
153. GRAMLICH, supra note 92, at 17.
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for example, proposes that consent "is the operational basis" 154
of the efficiency norm and, therefore, "consent to efficient solu-
tions can be presumed. ' 15 5 Likewise, in discussing the regula-
tion of risk, Herman Leonard and Richard Zeckhauser write:
"Cost-benefit analysis... is the appropriate way to determine
which public decisions affecting risk levels would gain the hy-
pothetical consent of the citizenry. We know of no other mech-
anism for making [policy] choices that has an ethical
underpinning."156
The argument these analysts give is an ingenious one.
First, they assume the truth of a familiar, if metaphysical, view
of human nature. They believe people are essentially self-inter-
ested maximizers intent on satisfying their interests and prefer-
ences. Leonard and Zeckhauser then argue: "What mechanism
for making decisions would individuals choose if they had to
contract before they knew their identities in society or the
kinds of problems they would confront? Our answer is that, on
an expected-value basis, cost-benefit analysis would serve them
best, and hence would be chosen."157
It is important to see that the conclusion of this argument
does indeed follow from the premises. A group of persons who
are essentially self-interested maximizers, "economic persons"
anxious only to satisfy desires, who did not know what their
desires would be, would rationally choose a cost-benefit ap-
proach, because it promises to maximize the satisfaction of de-
sire across society as a whole. Accordingly, these authors argue
that, given the truth of their description of the essence or na-
ture of persons, the cost-benefit approach in public policy has
society's implicit or hypothetical consent. 58
To see what is wrong with this argument, imagine how a
Moslem fundamentalist might alter it. In his view, the essen-
tial nature of man is to be defined in religious rather than in
economic terms. Man is essentially a creature of Allah meant
to praise His name and comply with His laws. Given this con-
ception of human nature, it is easy to show that society gives its
hypothetical or counterfactual consent to fundamentalist Mos-
lem laws rather than to the principles of microeconomic theory.
154. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in
Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 490 (1980).
155. Id. at 488.
156. Leonard & Zeckhauser, Cost-Benefit Analysis Applied to Risks: Its
Philosophy and Legitimacy, in VALuzs AT RISK 31, 33 (D. MacLean ed. 1986).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 33-36.
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Likewise, a Marxist might argue that individuals, were
they ignorant of their social identities, would base regulation on
this principle: "From each according to his abilities, to each ac-
cording to his needs."15 9 This is because people would recog-
nize their communal nature and assume the truth of dialectical
materialism as the accurate metaphysics of history. The Marx-
ist might then argue that the "apparent" will of the citizenry,
as expressed by its legitimate political representatives, can be
ignored because it is corrupted by bourgeois ideology, irration-
ality, heresy, or stupidity. The "real" social will is known to
those in the forefront of society who have the right philosophy,
analysis, religion, social theory, ideology, or understanding of
human nature. This kind of argument speaks for itself. 60
Long before it was written, the Leonard-Zeckhauser "hy-
pothetical consent" argument had been refuted by John Rawls,
whose "veil of ignorance" technique it ironically parodies. The
point of Rawls' A Theory of Justice161 is that, in liberalism, jus-
tice is a political, not a metaphysical concept. It depends on a
reflective equilibrium of values brought to bear in politics,
partly as a result of history, experience, and culture. The point
of the Rawlsian approach is its independence from and neutral-
ity among competing metaphysical views of history and of the
person. Policy analysts, by using the "veil of ignorance" argu-
ment as they have, replace a reflective equilibrium among nor-
mative principles with a metaphysical theory of the person, and
thus they make the same mistake from the right as communi-
tarian critics of Rawls make from the left.162
159. K. MARX, THE CRITICISM OF THE GOTHA PROGRAM (1875).
160. It should be emphasized that the "hypothetical consent" argument
used by Posner and Zeckhauser has no connection whatsoever with the legiti-
mate use of social contract theory found, for example, in J. RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE (1971). Rawls is concerned with establishing the basic structure of
institutions within a just society in which rational individuals may legitimately
pursue incommensurable conceptions of the good. See Rawls, The Basic Struc-
ture as Subjec4 14 A.M. PHIL. Q. 159 (1977). On the contrary, Posner and
Zeckhauser argue that a single conception of the good exists (e.g., preference-
satisfaction, wealth-maximization, etc.) upon which all rational individuals
would agree and, therefore, which may be assumed to have the hypothetical
consent of the community. It is precisely because every ideologue, zealot, and
academic-with-a-theory-of-the-common-good believes he is right and, there-
fore, that any rational and informed agent will necessarily agree with him (or
not be rational or informed) that the Rawlsian argument is necessary. It aims
at establishing social structures in which all these individuals, each with his
own conception of what rationality and morality demand, can live peaceably
together and secure the benefits of social cooperation.
161. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
162. See supra note 160.
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It is thus clear that the efficiency criterion in environmen-
tal policy has no normative basis. It is a mistake to think that
efficiency is to be "balanced" or "traded off" against some
other conflicting value, such as equity. Efficiency in the alloca-
tion of resources has no inherent worth or merit against which
such a value may be weighed.
This is not to deny the common sense view that the bene-
fits of any regulation should outweigh its costs to society as a
whole. It is only to say that the efficiency criterion fails to
measure, much less to maximize, benefits; the latter must be
assessed through the political process and cannot be deter-
mined on the basis of individual willingness-to-pay. Thus,
meaningful cost-benefit balancing is necessarily a result of,
rather than a desideratum in, legislation and the larger political
process in which public officials at various levels deliberate
over good and evil, right and wrong. This is a completely dif-
ferent process from anything that could take place within, or be
inferred from, consumer markets.
C. PUTTING A VALUE ON LIFE
Although pollution control law includes protections for the
environment, its primary purpose is to protect public safety and
health. Those who take an economic approach to understand-
ing these statutes, therefore, confront the vexing problem of es-
timating the value of life in monetary terms. The question of
what price should attach to a life saved or an injury avoided is a
particularly difficult one because life is usually considered
"priceless." Life does not have a value; rather it is the neces-
sary condition for the value of anything else, because presuma-
bly all values are values of living human beings.
In the 1950s and 1960s, "[tlhe most common approach to
valuation of life in the literature [was] the so-called productiv-
ity or human capital technique. '163 This method measured the
value of an individual's life in terms of his "marginal productiv-
ity," roughly, the amount he might expect to earn if he lived.
This method had two advantages. First, it relied on free, volun-
tary markets to measure value, in this instance, by distributing
income. Second, it was quantitative, giving policy analysts
numbers they could work with-numbers they could derive
from markets.
163. A. FREEMAN, THE BENEFITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT 169
(1979).
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The human capital technique also had drawbacks. Critics
questioned the idea that persons, like livestock, should be val-
ued principally by their contribution to the GNP.1' And the
approach was unpopular with retired people, housespouses,
poor people, poets, philosophers, and others whose lives might
have little or even negative worth under this system of
evaluation.
In 1969, T.C. Schelling wrote an influential paper that
changed economic thinking about the valuation of life and
limb.1 65 Instead of trying to place a value on a particular indi-
vidual's life by estimating her contribution to the GNP, Schel-
ling asks: "What is it worth to reduce the probability of
death-the statistical frequency of death-within some identifi-
able group of people none of whom expects to die except
eventually?' '1 66
This method asks, in other words, how much society is
willing to pay to increase safety by the marginal amount neces-
sary to save one unknown life. The loss of an actual life, a rela-
tive or friend, for example, engages strong moral sentiments,
such as were discussed in the first part of this Article. 167 By fo-
cusing attention instead on statistical lives, Schelling was able
to provide a more detached and theoretical context for regulat-
ing public safety and health.
According to Martin Bailey, "[t]he most direct evidence of
the amount people are willing to pay for their own safety
comes from the job market, which offers a variety of working
environments with various degrees of personal risk.' 168 By di-
viding the extra annual wage for the risky job by the extra an-
nual risk in the job, analysts have estimated what safety-or an
increased chance of avoiding death-is worth to those who take
dangerous jobs.169
Value-of-life estimates "range from $500,000 to $4 million"
in 1980 dollars.170 One may compare these figures with the
amounts industry spends per-life-saved to comply with federal
164. See, e.g., Seligman, How Much is Your Life Worth 7, FORTUNE, March
3, 1986, at 25.
165. Schelling, The Life You Save May Be Your Own, in PROBLEMS IN PUB-
LIC EXPENDITURE ANALYSIs 127 (S. Chase ed. 1968).
166. Id. at 127.
167. See supra notes 14-78 and accompanying text.
168. M. BAILEY, REDUCING RISKS TO LIFE: MEASUREMENTS OF THE BENE-
FIrs 31 (1980).
169. E.g., id at 33-35.
170. K. Viscusi, supra note 119, at 101 (the value-of-life estimates are
based on charts appearing at 99).
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pollution control legislation. Compliance costs far in excess of
these averages, insofar as it is possible to determine costs per-
life-saved, arguably would be inefficient.
This method of evaluating safety in the workplace and in
the environment has the same advantages as the marginal pro-
ductivity approach: it provides numbers and derives those
numbers from markets. On the other hand, it has theoretical
as well as practical 171 drawbacks.
First, data derived from labor and other markets do not re-
flect what people are willing to pay for safety but what they do
pay for it, largely as a result of governmental regulation and
jury awards in tort.1 72 Second, policy analysts, following
Chauncy Starr, 173 generally concede that the "price" attached
to an "involuntary" risk should be much higher-perhaps a
thousand times higher-than the price attached to the same
risk were it "voluntary."17 4 No one, however, has been able
successfully to explain or understand this distinction.
Consider the first difficulty. The value-per-life-saved ana-
lysts derived from labor markets increased dramatically after
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970175 took ef-
fect.1 76 Thus, the derived values may reflect not the worker's
171. This method of evaluation assumes that workers are aware of the
risks they take, so that they knowledgeably "trade" safety for dollars. We can-
not determine that this assumption is satisfied, however, without extensive in-
formation about the extent of the risks and the extent of the worker's
knowledge, both of which are difficult to determine.
172. For an excellent study of the effect of regulatory action and tort
awards on consumer product safety, see G. EADs & P. REUTER, supra note 16.
It is apparent that consumer willingness to pay for safety is less influential on
product design than tort awards and, to a lesser extent, safety regulation. Id.
at viii-x.
173. Starr, Social Benefit versus Technological Risk, 165 SCIENCE 1232, 1237
(1969) (concluding that "the public is willing to accept 'voluntary' risks
roughly 1000 times greater than 'involuntary' risks").
174. See, e.g., M. DOUGLAS, RISK ACCEPTABILrrY ACCORDING TO THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES (1985).
175. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84
Stat. 1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982)).
176. Data collected by Richard Thaler and Sherwin Rosen before OSHA
promulgated major regulations suggest a value of roughly $500,000 per-life-
saved in 1980 dollars. Thaler & Rosen, The Value of Saving a Life: Evidence
from the Labor Market, in HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION 289-95
(N. Terleckyj ed. 1976). Thaler and Rosen's calculations yielded a value-of-life
estimate of $200,000 ± $60,000. Id. at 294. Viscusi converted the estimate to
1980 dollars. K. VIsCUsI, supra note 119, at 99. Studies conducted by Viscusi in
1979 and 1981, in which the data reflects the effects of OSHA regulation, indi-
cate that the value-per-life-saved rises to roughly $3 and $4 million in 1980 dol-
lars. Id.
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willingness to pay for safety but the consequences of legislation
that forced industry to improve safety conditions.
In order to derive a value-per-life-saved that is not biased
by governmental regulation, it may be necessary to go back to
labor markets as they were at the turn-of-the-century. Rail-
road workers, miners, and others who labored under hazardous
conditions were apparently aware of the risks they took; the
dangers they faced, at any event, were part of the folklore that
surrounded those jobs. If efficiency were the goal, value-per-
life-saved, however low it may be, should be derived from un-
regulated markets such as these. No matter how many workers
die as a result, regulators could congratulate themselves for in-
creasing the expected utility of these maimed and dead
workers.1 77
Attitudes toward safety have changed since those early
years, of course, but this, too, may largely be the result of gov-
ernmental intervention.1 7 8 At any rate, a value-per-life-saved
derived from data taken from labor markets that have long
been regulated for safety will not necessarily demonstrate how
to allocate resources more efficiently. Instead, this value will
suggest how successful legislation has been in making markets
not more efficient but more humane.
Consider the second difficulty, that of distinguishing be-
tween "voluntary" and "involuntary" risks. Policy analysts
concerned with safety regulation in the workplace often argue
that "market-traded risks are the result of individual
choices."' 79 The analysts conclude that if these risks are ac-
ceptable to the individual, the risks should be acceptable to so-
ciety as well. 80 It would follow from this, however, that the
government should not regulate any risk a person knowingly
and voluntarily takes.
Arguably, under this principle, if you walk into the street
knowing the odds you might be hit by a drunk driver, the gov-
ernment should not be concerned by your death for you could
177. See supra note 120.
178. Bernard Kleiman, a negotiator for the United Steelworkers, makes
the point that OSHA regulations raised the consciousness of both labor and
management concerning safety issues. "Safety is a very tough thing to negoti-
ate. There are so many levels of consciousness to it.... Both sides have to be
hit over the head a good bit before they develop the consciousness that permits
them to move." BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, OSHA AND THE UNIONS:
BARGAINING ON JOB SAFETY AND HEALTH 14 (1973).
179. K. Viscusi, supra note 119, at 1.
180. Id at 156-68.
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have stayed at home, as might the worker as well. Deaths on
the highway are encountered as voluntarily as those in the
workplace; chances are taken because of a desire for the bene-
fits and in the hope that harm will not happen.
No known analysis can reveal which risks are "voluntary"
and which are not. Certain risks, such as crossing the street,
are "voluntary" in the very thin sense that they are knowingly
taken. Presumably, the conception of "individual choice" and
"voluntariness" that distinguishes market transactions is loftier
or more meaningful than this. No analyst has provided an ex-
planation of this more edifying conception of "individual
choice." Until such an analysis is found, the government would
seem equally justified in regulating danger in the workplace
and in the marketplace as danger in the streets.1 81
As already discussed, moreover, social and cultural factors,
such as the familiarity, controlability, and history of a hazard
influence its acceptability. The social meaning of a risk is often
more important to risk-takers than its actual magnitude. 182
Many distinctions, like the difference between voluntary and
involuntary, lead to application of a different standard-or at-
tachment of a different value-to lives saved in different situa-
tions and from different hazards and pollutants.
A value-per-life-saved may be a useful figure, however,
even if it cannot be applied equally in all situations and to all
181. Someone may reply that a common sense distinction exists between
the risk a worker voluntarily takes when he goes down into the mine and the
risk a pedestrian takes when he crosses the street. The miner comes to the
danger, while in the case of the pedestrian, the danger comes to him. This dif-
ference seems coincidental-we can imagine the pedestrian falling into a man-
hole-but it still may be instructive. Surely pollution involves risks and
dangers which come to the victim. Yet the victim might have kept or moved
away from the polluter; she might have taken iodine pills or worn a lead frock.
The question is how to discern which risk is voluntary and which is not.
The idea that a plaintiff cannot recover from an injury because he has
"come to the nuisance" is not much in favor nor, of course, must a person
move away from a polluter or keep his doors closed to avoid pollution. See
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 57, § 88B, at 634-35. Likewise, a
person may be said to "assume" or "accept" a risk if she behaves recklessly,
but not simply because she encounters a known danger, for example, in cross-
ing a street, but acts reasonably in the situation. Id. § 68, at 480-81. The con-
cept of "voluntary" and "involuntary" risk, it seems, has to be understood in
the context and circumstances to which it is applied; there is no general way of
understanding or applying this distinction.
182. See Geertz, Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight, in INTERPRE-
TIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE: A READER 181 (P. Rabinow and W. Sullivan eds. 1979).
See also supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text (discussing acceptability of
risks).
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risks and hazards. Attention to this "value" may help in ob-
serving large deviations in the amount spent per-life-saved to
control pollution in various industries. For instance, the risks
associated with nuclear power are controlled strictly, while
thousands succumb to cancer caused by smoking. Discrepancies
of this sort must be addressed. Good reasons may exist for such
discrepancies. For example, it may be justifiable to demand
more control of insidious and new risks than of ordinary and
familiar risks. Some discrepancies, however, may be baffling.
If these discrepancies cannot be justified, perhaps policies ought
to be changed.
In spite of its modest usefulness as a management tool, the
cost-benefit approach provides no help in setting standards.
Cost-benefit analysis, in its most acceptable form, cannot help
to determine how safe is safe enough, because it is an effect or
a result, not a condition, of the judgments needed to answer
that question. The value to be put on life is not an independent
preference people exhibit, but a complex judgment that itself
reflects upon and learns from prior regulation. It represents
the judgment not so much of the consumer but of the citizen; it
is the expression not of a market preference but of a public pol-
icy judgment.
D. IMPLEMENTING THE EFFICIENCY APPROACH:
BUBBLES AND BANKING
During the 1960s, economists revived the idea suggested by
Pigou that the government "internalize" the social costs of pol-
lution by imposing effluent taxes on industries that pollute.'
8 3
In theory, these taxes should be set at amounts that reflect the
social costs of each unit of each kind of effluent. In addition to
the theoretical difficulties already discussed, however, these
social costs per unit appear impossible to measure because
pollutants act synergistically, transform, and mix in the
environment.
Accordingly, some analysts have recommended that the
government set pollution standards on political grounds, much
as it sets targets for inflation and unemployment, and then use
a Pigouvian tax, an auction in rights-to-pollute, or some such
market mechanism, to reach those levels. 84 The general idea is
that polluters within a region who can most cheaply reduce
183. See, e.g., A. KNEESE, THE ECONOMICS OF REGIONAL WATER QUALrTY
MANAGEMENT 54-55 (1964).
184. Baumol, On the Taxation and the Control of Externalities, 62 AM.
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their effluents will do so rather than pay the tax, while others,
who derive greater marginal benefits from polluting, will pay
the tax or buy rights to pollute from those who can more
cheaply reduce their effluents. 185 Accordingly, a tax or similar
scheme should keep the cost of waste disposal in an area to a
minimum.
Not all economists favored this idea.186 Critics pointed out
that effluents have different effects per unit even within a re-
gion. For example, the emissions from industries near residen-
tial or wilderness areas may cause far more damage than the
same discharges from other industries located farther away or
in different wind currents. It would be efficient from a social
point of view for industries whose discharges did more damage
to invest relatively more money in abating them. An effluent
tax, however, encourages industries that can do so most
cheaply-not those that cause the most damage-to make mar-
ginal investments in controlling pollution.187
After 1979, discussion of market incentives for abating pol-
lution centered on the EPA's bubble policy.188 A "bubble"
imagines an entire plant to be surrounded by a hypothetical
dome and to have but one stack. Under this fiction, the plant
may reduce emissions from some sources in compensation for
not making more expensive emission reductions from others, as
long as a mandated overall reduction is achieved. Thus, in an
area as small as a single plant, where emissions are not likely
to have differential effects owing to location, the EPA has al-
lowed industries to treat different sources differently and, thus,
to control pollution in cost-saving ways.
Under the 1982 Emissions Trading Policy,189 establishing
ECON. REv. 307 (1972); Dales, Land, Water, and Ownership, 1 CANADIAN J.
ECON. 791 (1968).
185. See, e.g., Freeman, Air and Water Pollution Policy, in CURRENT Is-
SUES IN U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PoLicY 39-40 (P. Portney ed. 1978).
186. See Rose-Ackerman, Effluent Charges: A Critique, 6 CANADIAN J.
ECON. 512 (1973); Russell, What Can We Get from Effluent Charges 5 POL'Y
ANALYSIS 155 (1979).
187. Thomas Tietenberg, for example, pointed out that a uniform emissions
tax would minimize disposal costs only in the very special case in which all
emission sources affect the ambient environment in the same way per unit
emitted. This omits meteorological differences, for example, which make it so-
cially desirable not to tax sources uniformly. Tietenberg, Specific Taxes and
Pollution Control: A General Equilibrium Analysis, 87 Q.J. ECON. 503 (1973).
188. For a study of the history of the "bubble," see Lakhani, Air Pollution
Control by Economic Incentives in the U.S.: Policy, Problems, and Progress, 6
ENVTL. MGMT. 9, 9-20 (1982).
189. 47 Fed. Reg. 15076.
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an "emission reduction credit," the EPA has experimented with
offsets, nets, and emissions banks. Offsets enable new factories
to enter dirty air areas as long as they contribute no more new
effluents than they offset by securing reductions from existing
sources. Netting allows a factory to escape some regulatory re-
view of new technology as long as net emissions do not in-
crease. Finally, under emissions banking, firms can store for
future use, or even for sale, credits for "extra" or non-man-
dated reductions.
These market-based approaches to pollution control policy
have been controversial, but among the many criticisms dis-
cussed in the literature,190 one appears to be the most cogent.
Even if enforcement officials discount emission trading credits
at, for instance, twenty percent, they will achieve at best a
twenty percent incremental improvement over some baseline at
which trading is supposed to begin. The twenty percent im-
provement over a given baseline may not be as good as what
might be achieved in the absence of trading schemes; it is cer-
tainly not all that the Clean Air Act literally requires. It is use-
ful to understand this criticism and the replies offered by those
who defend emissions trading schemes.
Under an emissions trading system, an industry receives
credit for all or some percentage of an "extra!' or "surplus" re-
duction in emissions, for example, from a battery of coke ovens.
The industry is able to apply this credit against a mandated re-
duction at a neighboring battery, either its own or that of an-
other company that has purchased the credit.
In theory, emission trading has two principal advantages.
First, it gives polluters incentives to make all the reductions
they can at the least cost, thereby saving the polluters, consum-
ers, and society money. Second, by building a discount of, for
example, twenty percent, the EPA assures that aggregate pollu-
tion will be abated by that much over what would have been
achieved had polluters simply met initial requirements.
Critics point out, however, that under a trading scheme, a
firm may claim credits for reductions it would have made any-
way. For example, if a firm closes a coke oven battery, installs
hoods that happen to exceed requirements, or introduces a
cleaner way of coking, but for reasons that have nothing to do
with controlling pollution, it may claim reduction credits. The
190. See, e.g., Landau, Economic Dream or Environmental Nightmare?
The Legality of the "Bubble Concept" in Air and Water Pollution Contro 8
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 741 (1980) and articles cited therein.
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EPA cannot assess all the motivational, economic, and techno-
logical factors behind each claim. Consequently, it must grant
credits for many if not most of these fortuitous reductions.
The Clean Air Act, however, leaves little room either in its
language or in the way the courts have interpreted it for the
idea of an "extra" or a "surplus" reduction in emissions. On
the contrary, the Act recognizes no resting point. It requires,
for example, that new sources install the "best system of con-
tinuous emission reduction which . . . has been adequately
demonstrated."191
This suggests that if a firm develops a new technology that
reduces emissions better than a previous "best," it should not
be granted credit to use to reduce emissions less than it might
elsewhere. Rather, that new technology, if it works out, should
become the new "best," and should be required of the entire in-
dustry. The general purpose of pollution control law is to mini-
mize effluents as expeditiously as practicable. Accordingly, so-
called "extra" or "surplus" reductions are not extra or surplus
at all; they should be interpreted as being required by law.
Those who defend reduction credits reply that "[b]eneath
such arguments lies the view that more emissions reduction is
always better, that each possible increment of progress must be
seized because there is no 'stopping point' at which individual
or cumulative reductions are truly sufficient."' 92 Advocates of
emission trading urge that even if this view is correct, that is,
even if more reduction is always better, nevertheless, this "bet-
ter" has become a formidable enemy of the good, and it is
preventing agencies from doing all they can to abate
pollution.193
It is important to see the force of this reply. The reply
does not assume that there is some "milestone" at which reduc-
tions are sufficient, because the benefits of further reductions
would not justify the costs. Instead, the reply contends that the
best way to prevent industries from improving their perform-
ance beyond minimum requirements is to convert every addi-
tional reduction into a new minimum requirement.
If the desire to encourage improvements is serious, some
must be recognized and acknowledged as supererogatory, that
191. See supra note 4.
192. Levin, Building a Better Bubble at EPA, REGULATION, Mar.-Apr. 1985,
at 33, 35.
193. See, e.g., T.H. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN RE-
FORMING POLLUTION POLICY (1985).
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is, better than sufficient. This implies that society should ac-
cept some level of accomplishment as "good enough," to recog-
nize plateaus or resting-points to reward, and, therefore, to
encourage incremental progress. Those who favor emissions
trading systems contend, moreover, that such systems will pro-
vide greater reductions than without them, even if some reduc-
tions that would have happened anyway receive credit.
To suppose otherwise, according to this argument, is to
commit the fallacy of disparate comparison 194-the fallacy one
commits when comparing a good, but not great, cake actually
baked and on the table, with a picture of a fabulous torte with a
complicated recipe in a gourmet magazine.
The Clean Air Act, according to these critics, provides a
fantastically complex recipe along with a beautiful picture of
pollution-free air. The recipe has not produced anything like
what is shown in the picture so far, and few think that it will.
Meanwhile, the results of emission trading, although not as at-
tractive as the beautiful illustration, are still better than any re-
sults which have been, or may be, achieved by following
literally the directions provided in the Clean Air Act.
The principal environmentalist objection to "bubbles" and
related methods for controlling pollution is that they keep the
situation static; they assume an allowable level of pollution and
trade within it. The advantage of command-and-control regula-
tion, from this perspective, is that it allows continuous pressure
for improvement.
Given the realities of enforcement, however, it may be de-
sirable, even from the environmentalist point of view, to eat
the cake of progress that trading schemes promise and, at the
same time, have the cake of continuous improvement as well,
because standards can eventually be tightened. Trading policies
may help to achieve standards, but they do not directly help to
determine what those standards should be. The underlying
problems, therefore, are to define the standards themselves as
well as the process by which they will be determined.
Trading policies are most interesting, perhaps, because they
highlight the line at which ethical and economic considerations
meet-the line that divides aspirations from feasible achieve-
ments. Emission credit trading schemes recognize that "ought"
implies "can," and they proceed from the disparity between
ends aspired to and ends that can be achieved. The problem of
194. Gewirth, Positive "Ethics" and Normative "Science," 69 PHIL. REV.
311, 311-13 (1960).
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resolving the conflict between morals and markets or between
ethical and economic perspectives on environmental law is es-
sentially the problem of adjusting ideals to reality and of deter-
mining what ought to be done as a minimum and what might
count as supererogatory given the difficulties in achieving the
minimum.
III. INTEGRATING ETHICAL AND ECONOMIC
APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Regulation succeeds most easily when its purposes are
either plainly economic or plainly ethical. Examples of eco-
nomic regulations come readily to mind. The Federal Commu-
nications Commission, for example, regulates a public good, the
electromagnetic spectrum, to prevent ruinous competition that
might otherwise destroy a common resource. The Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation insures bank deposits, and the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank oversees interest rates. These regulatory
activities are economic in nature and the values they involve
can be adequately understood in economic terms.
Examples of ethical regulations are also easy to find. Ear-
lier this century, nearly a million children worked in the na-
tion's sweatshops and mines. Laws prohibiting child labor and
statutes establishing a maximum workday and a minimum
wage did not correct market failures because the transactions
involved were arguably informed and voluntary. These laws
had an ethical, not an economic purpose; they were intended to
make markets more humane, not more efficient.
Similarly, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 95 prohibits un-
ions, employment agencies, and employers from discriminating
on the basis of race, sex, or national origin. These statutes an-
swer to basic moral principles and cultural concerns that go to
America's identity as a nation. Those who approve and disap-
prove of these statutes offer arguments pro and con; they do
not simply reveal preferences. The laws are the subject of ethi-
cal deliberations on the merits in Congress, not marginal pric-
ing on a willingness-to-pay basis in markets.
Pollution control statutes, unlike laws prohibiting child la-
bor, however, stop short of giving the government a clear man-
date to go after an acknowledged evil and quickly eliminate it.
This is true because pollution, unlike slavery, child labor, dis-
crimination, segregation, poverty, or illiteracy, is not simply an
195. Civil Rights Act, § 703(a-c), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a-c) (1982).
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evil. Pollution is also a necessary evil that must be tolerated, at
least to some extent, if indispensable economic activity is to
continue and flourish. Society must respect the law of the land,
but in controlling pollution, society also must recognize the law
of diminishing returns.
It is impossible in the foreseeable future to prohibit pollu-
tion entirely and expect America's industrial economy to com-
ply and survive. Economic factors enter the ethical equation;
costs must be taken into account. In an effort to demonstrate
how this can be accomplished, the final part of this Article dis-
cusses the appropriate role of economic factors in determining
and implementing pollution control goals and standards.
A. ENDS AND MEANS IN POLLUTION CONTROL LAW
The Clean Air and Water Acts and other pollution control
statutes resemble laws that prohibit child labor and discrimina-
tion and those that combat poverty and illiteracy. Environmen-
tal statutes, in short, stand squarely in the tradition of
legislation that seeks to control and eliminate moral evils.
196
The Clean Air Act, for example, puts an ethical concern with
public safety and health ahead of economic and commercial in-
terests. It "does not allow economic growth to be accommo-
dated at the expense of the public health."'197 Courts have
concurred that the protection of public health is the "para-
mount consideration" of the Act.198 "It is generally accepted
that the Clean Air Act mandates a safety-first approach to in-
196. The primary purpose of the Clean Air Act is "to protect and enhance
the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health and
welfare ....." The Clean Air Act § 101(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (1982). Com-
pare the purpose of the Clean Air Act, which is plainly moral, both in a broad
utilitarian sense and in the deontological sense of protecting safety as a matter
of right, with the Clean Water Act § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982) ("The
objective of this chapter is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation's waters."). The Clean Air Act resists the in-
troduction of economic and even technological factors as bars to pollution con-
trol. "After surveying the relevant provisions of the Clean Air Amendments
of 1970 and their legislative history, we agree that Congress intended claims of
economic and technological infeasibility to be wholly foreign to the Adminis-
trator's consideration of a state implementation plan." Union Electric Co. v.
EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 256 (1976).
197. 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524, 55,527 (1976) (EPA Interpretive Ruling on 40
C.F.R. § 51.18 (1976) preconstruction review requirements for new or modified
air pollution sources in State Implementation Plans).
198. Union Electric Co., 427 U.S. at 272 (Powell, J., concurring).
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vestment in air quality." 99
Many who are concerned with the application of environ-
mental law assimilate the distinction between the economic and
the ethical to the difference between means and ends.200 Ac-
cording to this view, legislation states categorical ethical ends:
that pollution be controlled down to levels at which the most
sensitive groups are protected with an adequate margin of
safety.201 It is up to the implementing agency to take costs into
account and to balance economic factors by promulgating stan-
dards and rules, on a problem-by-problem basis, that will even-
tually achieve the ethical objectives of the law.20 2
Pollution control statutes invite, and sometimes require, an
interpretation that distinguishes between congressionally man-
dated goals and administrative policies. The former are not to
be compromised, at least over the long run, to accommodate
economic or technological factors. The latter must consider
economic and technological factors in trying to attain those
goals. The Clean Air Act, for example, requires the EPA to
consider economic and technological feasibility in setting new
stationary source20 3 and automobile emissions standards.204
Economic and technological feasibility, however, are not al-
199. Barnes, Back Door Cost-Benefit Analysis Under a Safety-First Clean
Air Act, 23 NAT. RES. J. 827, 828 (1983).
200. For an apt discussion of "ends and means in environmental law," see
B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 121 (1981) ("'ends-ori-
ented' agency-forcing does not require Congress to indulge in instrumental
judgments beyond its capacity. Instead, it generates a process by which the ul-
timate aims of environmental policy can be clarified over time." Ida at 122-23.).
201. The Clean Air Act mentions the protection of sensitive populations
once in relation to national ambiant air quality standards. Clean Air Act
§ 105(f)(1)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 7408(f)(1)(C) (1982). The legislative history, how-
ever, does contain an oft-cited commentary by the Senate Committee on Pub-
lic Works which states that primary air quality standards must be strict
enough to protect more susceptible groups. S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 10 (1970), supra note 32. For discussion of sensitive populations and envi-
ronmental protection, see R. FRIEDMAN, supra note 32.
202. For an expression of this general position, see Novick, supra note 35.
Novick writes:
When concern for the individual is given first priority, therefore,
costs should be weighed, but only as the limit on the speed with which
goals can be attained. Any delay in reaching the goal of zero pollution
means lives will be lost, yet the government cannot simply leap across
the intervening ground. Once the paramount concern for the injured
person is acknowledged, other considerations must be consulted. How
quickly can EPA achieve that person's protection?
Id. at 15.
203. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1)(C) (1982).
204. Id. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(i).
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lowed to affect the overall goals of the Act, but only the timeta-
ble for achieving them. Feasibility may begin to "affect when
the goals are met. The Act thus tries to use time to avoid
either compromising its ideals or ignoring feasibility.
'20 5
It is not surprising that many who are concerned with the
environment view pollution control legislation in terms of a ro-
bust distinction between ethical ends and practical means envi-
sioned by the law. This view generally conforms with
legislative history.206 It also provides an apparently strong, or
at least initially uncompromised, legal position with which cor-
porations must reckon.207 Senator Griffin described this aspect
of the Clean Air Act as "the concept of brinksmanship.' '208 Re-
ferring to automobile emissions and the auto industry, he said,
"[a]n industry pivotal to the U.S. economy is to be required by
statute to meet standards which the committee itself acknowl-
edges cannot be met with existing technology. '20 9
In addition, a sharp distinction between means and ends
preserves the ethical dimension of pollution control statutes
while permitting economic constraints to enter at a different
level. Environmentalists generally would exclude cost-benefit
analysis as a technique of social policymaking because it substi-
tutes a non-normative goal, allocatory efficiency, for the ethical
goals Congress has legislated. Yet environmentalists may show
their reasonableness by tolerating cost-effectiveness analysis at
205. Schoenbrod, supra note 3, at 759 (footnotes omitted).
206. The 90% reduction requirements for automobile emissions under the
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (a)(3)(A)(ii)(I) (1982), for example, represent
what Congress believed necessary to protect the public health, not what it
thought was economically or technologically feasible. See Gubrud, The Clean
Air Act and Mobile.Source Pollution Control, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 523, 526-28
(1975).
207. The sponsors of the Clean Air Act considered the nonincremental as-
pect of the legislation an advantage. Thus, when Senator Griffin accused the
sponsors of playing "'economic roulette' with millions of jobs in the automo-
bile industry," Senator Muskie replied, "I would rather play Russian roulette
with the automobile companies than with the trapped inhabitants of urban
America. Their health is involved." 116 CoNG. REC. 32,906 (1970).
208. 116 CONG. REC. 33,080 (1970). Former EPA Administrator Ruckel-
shaus, speaking in 1974, recalled his use of brinksmanship in the early days of
the agency:
I started out with a fairly arbitrary stance that must have appeared to
be very unreasonable, if not irrational, to a lot of the people I was reg-
ulating.... [I]f some of the things I said struck them as just a little
bit irrational, I thought that would stimulate them more than any-
thing else I could do. So, I would purposely from time to time make
statements that went over the edge.
Henderson & Pearson, supra note 6, at 1449 n.89.
209. 116 CONG. REC. 33,080 (1970).
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the level of implementation. 210 As Michael Baram points out,
"[c]ost-benefit analysis is used by the decisionmaker to estab-
lish societal goals as well as the means for achieving these
goals, whereas cost-effectiveness analysis only compares alter-
native means for achieving 'given' goals."2 11
There is a final and principal reason that those concerned
with environmental quality distinguish sharply between the
ethical concerns involved in setting goals and the economic and
other constraints involved in implementing them. To think of
the legislature as involved in principled moral deliberation and,
therefore, as setting the elimination of pollution as a national
goal, is to recognize that Congress does not simply balance in-
terests. Congress may also consider moral, cultural, and other
values on their merits and in their own terms. By differentiat-
ing legislative and administrative activities in this way, environ-
mentalists connect public values with public policy and clarify
the rights and principles on which pollution control legislation
is ultimately based.2 12
Unfortunately, the sharp dichotomy between moral ends
and prudential or expedient means allows a distance to develop
between legislated goals and the policies promulgated to imple-
ment them.2 13 As this distance becomes more and more obvi-
ous-because inadequate implementation plans are approved,
deadlines are allowed to slip, violations are left unmonitored,
compromising consent decrees are signed, harmful pollutants
are not listed, standards are set partly on economic grounds,
scientific evidence is scanty and uncertain, and resolutions are
210. For a discussion of the distinction between cost-benefit and cost-effec-
tiveness analysis in water pollution control law, see Zener, The Federal Law of
Water Pollution Control, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 682, 696-702 (E.
Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974).
211. Baram, Cost-Benefst Analysis: An Inadequate Basis for Health, Safety,
and Environmental Regulatory Decisionmaking, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 473, 478
(1980).
212. Larry Wade observes that "politics is more than a struggle over the
distribution of material values. It is also a social process through which sym-
bolic values, representing needs for self-esteem, dignity, and personal recti-
tude, are distributed and validated." L. WADE, THE ELEMENTS OF PUBLIC
POLICY 14 (1972).
213. Early in the 1970s, critics of pollution control legislation argued that
the statutes should be more incremental and less revolutionary because, how-
ever revolutionary they may be, they can be implemented only incrementally.
See, e.g., Schulman, Nonincremental Policy Making: Notes Toward an Alter-
native Paradigm, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 1354 (1975); J. PRESSMAN & A.
WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION: How GREAT EXPECTATIONS IN WASHINGTON
ARE DASHED IN OAKLAND (1973).
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delayed indefinitely in litigation-the law itself, for all of its as-
pirational language, begins to lose touch with reality.214 Articles
appear which accurately describe the "deflation," 215 "relaxa-
tion,"21 6 and "erosion '217 of the Clean Air Act and "back door
cost-benefit analysis" in safety-first legislation.
21 8
Critics often contend that pollution control legislation has
eroded because it has delegated too much authority to the agen-
cies to make the important regulatory decisions. One commen-
tator writes that "the problem with the goals statutes that
broadly delegate decision-making authority is that they leave
key value choices to low visibility decisionmakers fearful of
making controversial choices." 219 The same point can be made,
however, without embarking on the dark and stormy seas of
the overdelegation argument. 220 When the ends of legislation
are determined independently of the means of achieving them,
the ends recede from attention and all interest centers on spe-
cific administrative actions. As then EPA Administrator Doug-
las Costle remarked in 1980, "the system is so cumbersome and
problematical that it almost literally forces us to focus on the
trees instead of the forest."221
The tendency of individual regulatory trees to obscure the
legislative forest can be illustrated in many ways. Consider, for
214. Consent decrees worked out by the EPA and industry reveal this gen-
eral problem. These decrees typically contain two sections: the "W'hereas"
section, which refers to statutory requirements and the nature of the alleged
violation, and the "Therefore" section, which lists steps an emitter agrees to
take to reduce or control its emissions. Anyone who reads a number of these
documents may come away with the impression that the steps described in the
second section are so tenuously related to the goals stated in the first that the
word "Therefore," traditional in these decrees, should be changed routinely to
"Nevertheless." These decrees sometimes represent on a case by case basis,
however, the best progress that can be expected at a particular time, given the
difficulties of enforcing deadlines, determining compliance, and litigating
agency actions.
215. Schoenbrod, supra note 3, at 766.
216. Currie, Relaxation of Implementation Plans Under the 1977 Clean Air
Act Amendments, 78 McH. L. REV. 155, 155 (1979).
217. Walker & Storper, Erosion of the Clean Air Act of 1970: A Study in
the Failure of Government Regulation and Planning, 7 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 189, 189 (1978).
218. Barnes, supra note 199.
219. Schoenbrod, supra note 3, at 753-54.
220. For an indication of the difficulties and perplexities which surround
this issue, see Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst.,
448 U.S. 607 (1980) (known as the Benzene case).
221. D. Costle, EPA Administrator, Remarks at the Meeting of the Air
Pollution Control Association in Montreal, Canada 9-19 (June 23, 1980)
(quoted in Schoenbrod, supra note 3, at 749).
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example, the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS) called for by the Clean Air Act.222 The goal of the
Clean Air Act is not to promulgate these standards but "to pro-
tect the public health and welfare by improving the quality of
the nation's air."2 23 When considered in the context of the stat-
ute as a whole, "it becomes apparent that the NAAQS are not
goals, with the emissions control programs means of imple-
menting them; instead both the NAAQS and the emissions con-
trol programs are instruments for achieving the broader goal of
controlling air pollution. '224
In practice, however, the health, safety, and welfare goals
of the Clean Air Act tend to get lost amid an intricate web of
negotiations involving the EPA, the states, corporations, and
the courts over the enforcement of the NAAQS. 225 As George
Eads wrote, "[i]n this complex and politically explosive negoti-
ating process the NAAQS have, in fact, taken on a life of their
own and, in doing so, have become something very much like
goals" of legislation.226
The NAAQS may not have become surrogate statutory
goals; the situation may be worse than that. Particular deci-
sions, such as who to penalize for violations caused in part by
222. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1982) (primary air quality standards) and id.
§ 409(b)(2) (secondary standards).
223. American Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1181 (1981) (citing
42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)).
224. Eads, The Confusion of Goals and Instruments: The Explicit Consid-
eration of Cost in Setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards, in To
BREATHE FREELY: RISK, CONSENT, AND AIR 222, 226 (M. Gibson ed. 1985).
This view contradicts that stated by Schoenbrod: "The goal is the attainment
of the ambient standards." Schoenbrod, supra note 3, at 785 (footnote omit-
ted).
The difference between the NAAQS and the goals of the Clean Air Act
was clear to the framers of the statute. "The establishment alone of air qual-
ity standards has little effect on air quality. Standards are only the reference
point for the analysis of the factors contributing to air pollution and the impo-
sition of control strategy and tactics." S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11-
12 (1970). The NAAQS, in other words, were not to function as surrogate
goals but as important referents for implementation plans intended to attain
the goals of legislation. Id. at 12.
225. EPA Administrator Costle stated:
The air program is probably the most intellectually thin program
we've got and it is the most overbuilt in terms of the law and the
structure and the size.... That's a program that really has a church
history problem. Every single congressional battle and staff battle is
relevant to understanding why you're at the point you are now.
R. MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT
24 (1983) (quoting EPA Administrator Costle).
226. Eads, supra note 224, at 227.
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the interstate transport of pollution, have become the central
intellectual and regulatory foci presented by the Clean Air Act.
The question is not asked, and no one could possibly answer,
whether it is good or bad for public health that the EPA re-
quire Indiana to change its implementation plan so that Penn-
sylvania can increase its pollution without violating the
NAAQS.2 27 In many instances, the connection between regula-
tory disputes and human health, safety, and welfare has be-
come difficult to trace.
To the extent students of environmental law emphasize
the distinction between moral legislative ends and pragmatic
regulatory means for achieving them, they must be able to
show, nevertheless, a causal connection between administrative
decisions and the protection of public safety and health. As
regulatory deadlines are missed, draconian penalties not as-
sessed, and pollutants not listed, all in the name of taking costs
into account, this connection becomes more and more difficult
to describe.228 The question has to arise whether the country
might not make more progress toward cleaning the environ-
ment if the goals set by legislation had initially taken economic
and related factors into account.229 Choosing a closer point of
aim might allow the regulatory arrow to fly farther in the in-
tended direction.
Because the very economic and technological factors that
227. The problems of connecting the NAAQS to safety and health are over-
whelming in themselves, given the lack of sound epidemiological evidence
and the precarious usefulness of animal studies. See, e.g., Mantel & Schneider-
man, Estimating "Safe" Levels, A Hazardous Undertaking, 35 CANCER RE-
SEARCH 1379, 1379-86 (1978); McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion
in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcino-
gens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L. REV. 729, 734 (1979); Schneiderman, Man-
tel, & Brown, From Mouse to Man-Or How to Get from the Laboratory to
Park Avenue and 59th Stree4 246 ANNALs N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 237, 241 (1975).
228. The problem is not that an administration unsympathetic to environ-
mental goals now administers pollution control statutes. The same difficulties
of enforcement plagued pro-environment administrations. Schoenbrod notes:
Measures needed to achieve ambient air standards within the statu-
tory timetable included cutting gasoline use in the Los Angeles area
by over 80%, eliminating 30-40% of the parking in the business areas
of Manhattan, and prohibiting the construction of new plants whose
emissions would cause or contribute to violations of the ambient air
standards, even if the new plants would meet the New Source Per-
formance Standards.
Schoenbrod, supra note 3, at 762 (footnotes omitted). The reason the law was
not enforced in these and many other respects has little to do with the polit-
ical persuasion of the President.
229. See the discussion of "bubbles" supra notes 188 & 190 and accompany-
ing text.
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Congress excluded from the purposes of the Clean Air Act
have been so thoroughly accommodated in their implementa-
tion, the Act itself, according to Eads, "thus becomes ... a 'pol-
icy fiction,' and arguments, intense though they may be, about
changing the structure of the act to reflect these accommoda-
tions become arguments, at least in part, over the value of
maintaining this policy fiction. '230 Many analysts and commen-
tators who share this view argue that environmental quality
could be improved more quickly and at less cost if the laws
were more realistic, if the statutes set more feasible goals, for
example, or simply prescribed rules of conduct and behavior.23 1
Certain aspects of some pollution control statutes have at-
tained the status of fictions that may no longer be useful. The
Clean Water Act, for example, declares "the national goal that
the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be elimi-
nated by 1985."232 Similarly, the Marine Protection, Research
and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 indicates that Congress had hoped
all ocean dumping would be minimized or ended by 1977.233
230. Eads, supra note 224, at 229.
231. See Schoenbrod, supra note 3, in which he states:
Statutes must be judged not only by the theoretical desirability of the
duties that they would impose, but also by the costs, feasibility, and
fairness of the process for converting statutory language into enforced
duties. Stating rules of conduct in the statute itself forces the legisla-
ture to make the key decisions.
Id. at 743-44. See also B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, supra note 200 (conclud-
ing that the Clean Air Act, despite its attempt to develop an improved admin-
istrative process, could have reached its goals more cheaply, more quickly, and
more surely by other means); L. LAvE & G. OMENN, supra note 32 (recom-
mending that Congress redesign the Clean Air Act's framework and goals to
eliminate conflicts in values); Currie, supra note 216 (suggesting that costs re-
sulting from the Clean Air Act's complexity and inflexibility could be reduced
by a provision allowing for variances); Henderson & Pearson, supra note 6 (ar-
guing that in environmental regulation, where it is against the competitive in-
terests of the regulated to voluntarily cooperate with aspirational commands,
such laws can be expected to lead to frustration and, in some cases, produce
results contrary to those intended); Orloff, Rethinking Environmental Law,
N.Y. Times, May 10, 1981, at F3, col. 1 (advocating that environmental laws be
made more self-executing to reduce their drag on productivity).
232. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1982).
233. This Act states:
The Secretary of Commerce shall conduct.., research, investigations,
experiments, training, demonstrations, surveys, and studies for the
purpose of determining means of minimizing or ending all dumping of
materials within five years of the effective date of this Act.
Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-532,
Title II, § 206, 86 Stat. 1052, 1061 (1972) (current version at 33 U.S.C.
§ 1443(a)(1) (1982)). Congress extended the deadline to "as soon as possible af-
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These directives have evaporated into vague aspirations which
may attract less respect than scorn to the law.
On the other hand, draconian aspirational directives in the
law sometimes give administrators the ammunition they need
to confront corporate developers and polluters. This kind of
"brinksmanship" works very well, for example, in the Endan-
gered Species Act,234 particularly in helping agency decisions
stand up in court.235 The 1978 Amendments to the Endangered
Species Act,236 moreover, set up a high-level administrative re-
view process with power to grant exceptions. This structure
has served to resolve conflicts of interests through attempts to
mitigate the effects of proposed projects. 237
The question arises whether the "cost-oblivious" 238 provi-
sions of the Clean Air Act deserve to be maintained because
they provide regulators the legal ammunition they need to gain
the respect of polluters, or in other words, whether
"brinksmanship" works under the Clean Air Act.
The answer, because it necessitates speculation on what
might have been achieved otherwise, is unclear and depends
upon the interpretation one gives to events. Generally, critics
cite the imposition of emission controls on automobiles as an in-
stance in which "brinksmanship" did not work very well.239 On
the other hand, the uncompromising goals of the Clean Air Act
ter the date of the enactment of this section." Act of Oct. 6, 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-381, 94 Stat. 1523.
234. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1982).
235. The directive of the Act is so clear that between 1973 and 1978 only
seven reported cases were litigated under it. They were: Tennessee Valley
Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289 (8th
Cir. 1976); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976); United States v. Cappaert, 508 F.2d 313 (9th Cir.
1974), aff'd, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); Libby Rod & Gun Club v. Poteat, 457 F. Supp.
1177 (D. Mont. 1978), aff'd in part and rev'd in par, 594 F.2d 742 (9th Cir.
1979); Connor v. Andrus, 453 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D. Tex. 1978); Defenders of
Wildlife v. Andrus, 428 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1977).
236. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92
Stat. 3751 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1982)).
237. For a discussion of the activities of the Endangered Species Commit-
tee, see Note, Environmental Law-The Endangered Species Act Amendments
of 1978: Congress Responds to Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill 25 WAYNE
L. REV. 1327, 1336-40 (1979).
238. Rodgers, supra note 32, at 201 ("These cost-oblivious provisions are ex-
emplified by the national ambient air standards of the Clean Air Act, the fish-
able/swimmable criteria of the Clean Water Act, and a variety of other well-
known prescriptions." (footnotes omitted)).
239. See, e.g., L. WHITE, THE REGULATION OF AIR POLLUTANT EMissIoNs
FROM MOTOR VEHICLES 17-23 (1982).
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allowed the EPA, in refusing to relax the ozone standard more
than it did, to use "the threat of litigation by environmental
groups to strengthen its position against opposition from within
the executive branch."240
Environmentalists may have a very different reason, how-
ever, for favoring the idea that minimum health and safety re-
quirements be determined without consideration of their
economic impact. Environmentalists may argue that the legis-
lation reflects Congress's "moral judgment that efficiency con-
siderations are inappropriate in some areas of regulation. '241 A
government should not hang an innocent man for crimes he did
not commit, after all, even if this would serve the public inter-
est by deterring other crimes. Similarly, a government should
not condemn individuals to die because the measured benefits
of polluting activities exceed the costs.
Environmentalists may hold to this position, moreover, be-
cause they fear what might become of pollution control legisla-
tion if minimal health and safety requirements are made
explicitly sensitive to costs. It is simple enough to write laws
that instruct agencies to set goals and targets with "technologi-
cal feasibility and economic practicability" in mind.242 Yet
agencies and even the courts are likely to interpret this vague
language, for lack of a better approach, as mandating or at least
permitting a cost-benefit test.243
The problem, therefore, is how to take economic and other
realities into account in setting the goals of environmental law
without changing those goals from ethical into economic ones.
If legislated goals are to take costs into account, whether this
"balancing" is performed by Congress or delegated to the agen-
cies, the importance of the goal must somehow be compared to
the costs involved in achieving it. The only readily apparent
method of making this comparison is expressed in economic
terms. The goals, human safety and health, are thus measured
in terms of "benefits," i.e., risk reductions for which individuals
240. R. MELNICK, supra note 225, at 293.
241. Rodgers, supra note 32, at 202 (footnote omitted).
242. Energy Policy and Conservation Act, § 374(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6344
(b)(2) (1982).
243. This happened with respect to the Energy Policy and Conservation
Act. See Rodgers, supra note 32, at 208. Rodgers notes that courts generally
have held that cost-sensitive statutes do not require formal cost-benefit analy-
sis. "But vague statutory criteria for consideration of costs have yielded nota-
ble differences of interpretation of identical statutory clauses." Id at 209
(footnote omitted).
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are willing to pay, and this amount is compared to the societal
costs of controlling pollution.244 As a result of this process, so-
ciety may lose sight of the moral purposes of public law and
find itself instead legislating allocatory efficiency, which is a
microeconomic concern that has no discernible ethical meaning
or normative basis.
Stated another way, public law, arrived at through an open
and deliberative political process, at least in theory, represents
the beliefs, aspirations, or will of the community, a collective
judgment about right and wrong. It does not necessarily repre-
sent wants and preferences of the sort individuals reveal and
attempt to satisfy in markets. 245 Environmental law, in particu-
lar, may express what one court described as "the public con-
science. ' ' 246  To approach moral principles and public
convictions as if these were "benefits" for which individuals are
willing to pay is incomprehensible; it is like thinking of the
square root of two in terms of its color. The problem is not that
attempts to "price" moral, aesthetic, and other principles as
benefits may "dwarf soft variables."2 4 7 The problem with these
attempts is that they commit a category mistake.
248
Accordingly, environmentalists and others concerned with
environmental policy are not necessarily opposed in principle to
taking costs into account in determining the goals of environ-
mental law. They tend to reject in principle, however, the pre-
sumption that it is not the environment or public safety and
health that is the focus of concern, but allocatory efficiency or
the maximization of benefits over costs. Cost-oblivious legisla-
tion at least allows people to keep sight of what, after all, is the
244. The original ethical purposes of the statute might reappear as "citizen
preferences" or "soft variables" to be assigned a "shadow price." For criticism
of this inventive method of treating moral and political concerns as data for
economic science, see Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement
Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981).
245. For a good study of the relationship between private preferences and
public values in politics, see A. 0. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 117. See also supra
notes 121-129 and accompanying text (discussing satisfaction of personal
preferences).
246. Hill v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 549 F.2d 1064, 1074 (6th Cir. 1977),
aff'd, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
247. Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The
Limits of Instrumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 617, 630-31 (1973).
248. A category mistake occurs when facts or concepts belonging to one
logical type or category are treated as if they belonged to another. For a tech-
nical explanation of this kind of error, see Ryle, Categories, in ESSAYS ON
LOGIC AND LANGUAGE 65 (A. Flew ed. 1953). For a less technical account, see
G. RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 16-18 (1966).
1986]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ultimate goal. To consider costs in setting pollution control
objectives, while not necessarily wrong in itself, is frightening
because it allows the nose of the camel under the tent.
To take costs properly into account in determining long-
run regulatory goals, a different conceptual framework, other
than that provided by academic theories of welfare economics,
is necessary. Moral problems must be addressed in moral
terms. Accordingly, this Article offers a conceptual framework
drawn from ethical theory in which it is appropriate to consider
means, including costs, in determining the ends of legislation.
B. SUPEREROGATION IN POLLUTION CONTROL LAW
Cleaning up America, like building the transcontinental
railway and going to the moon, is a national effort. It is a pro-
ject that involves citizens as citizens, not simply as individuals.
The environment is a collective concern, and in protecting it,
the country protects part of its history, part of its identity, and
part of its idea of itself as a nation.
The national idea in public policy, as Sam Beer has written,
is a doctrine of nation-building. "Its imperative is to use the
power of the nation as a whole not only to promote social im-
provement and individual excellence, but also to make the na-
tion more solidary, more cohesive, more interdependent in its
growing diversity; in short, to make the nation more of a
nation.1249
An important difference exists, however, between pollu-
tion control and other "nation-building" activities, such as the
space program. People had a rough idea of what would be nec-
essary to beat the Russians to the moon. The costs were rea-
sonable, the technology available, the political forces in place.
When the nation declared a "war against pollution" in the
1960s, however, no one knew exactly what would be required to
win. It was a moral crusade in which partisans were not always
aware of the political, technological, and economic forces they
were up against.
A review of the battles fought over pollution during the
past twenty years reveals how the goals that the nation has ac-
tually attempted to achieve have been deeply affected, although
sometimes unintentionally, by an appraisal of the means neces-
sary to achieve them. Twenty years ago, this "means" appraisal
was difficult to make, because no one really knew what eco-
249. Beer, supra note 71, at 71.
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nomic, technological, and political opportunities and obstacles
to expect. The mood then was to experiment with innovative
methods and to see how far the environmental "revolution"
would extend.250 Now, many economic, technological, and
political constraints have become apparent. The dilemma
presented is to discover a method, within the boundaries of eth-
ical deliberation, which takes these constraints into account in
revising the goals of pollution control legislation.
To engage in ethical deliberation, these known constraints
must be considered. Deliberation is, after all, nothing but the
appraisal of ends in relationship to the means likely to be used
to achieve those ends, and, therefore, of the means that will
lead to the outcomes actually produced. To will the end, one
must also will the means necessary to achieve it; one must as-
sess ends in relation to the means they require. "There can be
no control of the operation of foreseeing consequences (and
hence of forming ends-in-view) save in terms of conditions that
operate as the causal conditions of their attainment."' 1
The problem with values that are conceived of as intrinsi-
cally right or good is that, like all other interests and desires,
they are subject to failure and defeat. The difference between
reasonable and unreasonable purposes and goals, as John
Dewey writes, is precisely the difference between those which
are formed without "consideration of the conditions that will
actually decide the outcome and those which are formed on the
basis of existing liabilities and potential resources."252 Saying
"America shall not lose" will not alter the fact that it may very
well lose; in fact, it often does lose in the battle to abate
pollution.
250. Speaking of his motives in 1970, Senator Muskie said, "We had a
choice: we could continue, and try to improve, past initiatives or we could
change course and experiment with innovative methods which might achieve
results at a more rapid pace." Ingram, The Political Rationality of Innovation
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, in APPROACHES TO CONTROLLING AIR
POLLUTION, at 12, 32 (A. Friedlaender ed. 1978) (quoting Remarks by Sen. Ed-
mund S. Muskie, Univ. of Detroit Student Bar Ass'n Symposium on Envtl.
Law, Detroit, Mich., Feb. 20, 1976).
251. J. DEWEY, THEORY OF VALUATION 25 (1939).
252. Id, at 29. Dewey's point is that learning from experience is a principal
aspect of rationality. Moral reasoning, like other forms of reasoning, is experi-
mental. Experiments with controlling pollution have made us aware of many
facts, e.g., that "safe" thresholds for many pollutants do not exist, that scien-
tific uncertainty surrounds most attempts at risk-assessment, that draconian
measures are often unenforceable, that in reducing some risks, one increases
others, and so on. Lessons such as these may-Dewey would say "must"-
enter ethical deliberation over the ends of pollution control law.
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Efforts to achieve a cleaner, safer, more beautiful environ-
ment are constrained, of course, by economic costs. "Ought"
does not mean "can." What "can" be done, however, depends in
part on the importance of the ethical duty at stake. A determi-
nation of the environmental quality that "can" be achieved
must therefore, at least in part, depend on the significance of
underlying ethical principles.
The relationship proposed here between the ethical and
the economic is familiar in both individual and societal deci-
sions. For instance, in deciding how much to donate to relieve
hunger in Africa, a person must consider economic factors. An
initial consideration is how much can be afforded; one may be
expected to give only "until it hurts." One might try to assess
one's "fair share" given the ability of others also to help. It is
also useful to know which organizations direct contributions
most effectively in providing famine relief.
Some might argue that because charity is a virtue, people
have a duty to give all they have to those less fortunate. Such
an argument would be preposterous. Some duties are absolute:
for example, the duty not to murder or enslave others. One
must respect the duty not to murder even if it means foregoing
a fortune.2s3 Yet no one is required to observe the duty of char-
ity to the point of self-impoverishment.
The distinction in ethical theory involved here, a very old
concern of ethical theory, is usually drawn between "perfect"
and "imperfect" duties.25 4 A perfect duty, such as the duty not
to take an innocent life, does not admit of exceptions. An im-
perfect duty, such as the duty to rescue a stranger, may be
253. For example, the fact that one can go from rags to riches by murder-
ing one's grandmother does not permit one morally to do so.
254. The distinction is formulated by Kant but probably goes back to medi-
eval philosophy. The crucial distinction as Kant formulates it is this: "Ethical
Duties are of wide obligation, whereas juridical duties are of narrow obliga-
tion." I. KANT, THE DOCTRINE OF VIRTUE: PART II OF METAPHYSIC OF
MoRALs 49 (M.J. Gregor, trans. 1964). The latter, being narrow or rigorous
(e.g., thou shalt not kill) is "perfect" because it allows no exception in the in-
terest of inclination. The former kind of duty, e.g., to rescue, admits of excep-
tions (e.g., when one is an insecure swimmer) and is therefore "imperfect."
Kant suggests the relation between this distinction and the concept of superer-
ogation. "Imperfect duties, accordingly, are only duties of virtue. To fulfill
them is merit (meritum = +a); but to transgress them is not so much guilt
(demeritum = -a) as rather mere lack of moral worth (=0), unless the agent
makes it his principle not to submit to these duties." Id. See also M.J. GRE.
GOR, LAWS OF FREEDOM: A STUDY OF KANT'S METHOD OF APPLYING THE CAT-
EGORICAL IMPERATIVE IN THE Metaphysik der Sitten ch. 7 (1963) (discussing
perfect and imperfect duties).
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overridden by conditions or constraints, for example, one's own
inability to swim. Kant correctly points out that imperfect du-
ties are duties of virtue, rather than duties of moral obligation
or requirement. Actions in accordance with these duties are
meritorious; actions not in accord with them are not necessarily
wrong but may simply lack moral worth.25
The difficult question is whether the principles of pollution
control law discussed in the first part of this Article impose
perfect or imperfect obligations. Plainly, polluters have a per-
fect obligation not to kill people. Society is horrified to hear re-
ports that a corporation willfully or even negligently vented
toxic substances that killed identifiable individuals. The gov-
ernment, equally plainly, has an obligation to prohibit this sort
of serious incident, both through statutory and tort law. The
EPA, for example, moved swiftly to reduce exposure to vinyl
chloride when it discovered that deaths resulted from exposure
to that pollutant.256 When deaths can be attributed to particu-
lar exposures, society must honor the right of innocent individ-
uals not to be killed.
With respect to background hazards and risks, however, it
is different. No one has a right to be protected from de
minimis hazards or to a completely risk-free environment.
The highways, for example, can hardly be safe, and although
everyone has a perfect obligation not to drive recklessly, no one
is bound to drive at ten miles per hour, even if that would re-
duce traffic fatalities by many thousands. At some point, a duty
of obligation shades into a duty of virtue. At that point, safety
becomes more a matter of virtue than an ethical requirement.
A perfectly unpolluted environment is meritorious from a
moral point of view, and society acts virtuously in attempting to
eliminate pollution, just as it acts virtuously in attempting to
eliminate poverty. Yet a society that stops short of committing
enormous resources to efforts of this kind does not necessarily
violate moral obligations. Rather, such a society simply fails to
rescue citizens who, because of a variety of synergistic causes,
some of which involve industrial pollution, die before their
time. A society that makes it a principle to fail in this way, by
adopting, for example, an economic rather than a moral basis
for policy making, need not be violating a perfect duty. Its pol-
icy, however, has no moral worth.
255. Id. For further discussion, see Chisholm, The Ethics of Requiremen4
1 AM. PHIL. Q. 147 (1964).
256. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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On the other hand, if society sets out to rescue everyone,
its policy is morally praiseworthy, but it goes further and fur-
ther beyond the call of duty as the costs mount. One might ar-
gue, indeed, that the government has no duty to act in a
manner far more noble and praiseworthy than that expected of
individuals.
Thus, the problem of taking costs into account in setting
goals and standards for pollution control may be conceptualized
as the problem of determining what is a matter of duty and
what, because it exceeds the call of duty, is a matter of honor
and virtue. Acting for moral reasons beyond the call of duty is
usually described as supererogation. 257 The degree to which a
person engages in a moral activity, such as giving to charity, de-
pends on her circumstances as well as her principles. It de-
pends, for example, on what she can afford to do, the means at
her disposal, and how she plans to distribute the costs.
In setting goals and standards in pollution control law, soci-
ety must recognize that ending pollution entirely may be so far
beyond society's means at this point that such a goal lies well
beyond the call of duty. Controlling pollution is ethically
good-just as rescuing a drowning person is good-but circum-
stances may render this action supererogatory. Levels of pollu-
tion at which the known risks are severe and innocent deaths
certain to result, are, of course, impermissible. Yet when
thresholds are uncertain, risks conjectural, and epidemiological
evidence absent, society does not have a perfect duty to prevent
deaths but an imperfect duty to reduce risks and save lives.
It is a duty nonetheless, but one that invites consideration
of which policies should be implemented because of their moral
worth and which policies can be postponed as supererogatory,
given the costs of achieving them. That progress toward goals
must be deliberate but need not succeed all at once is evident in
court decisions recognizing that economic "feasibility" is a legit-
imate factor to be considered in protecting safety and health,2 5 8
that the law does not protect against insignificant risks,25 9 and
257. There is a surprisingly small amount of literature on this crucial ethi-
cal concept. For this literature, see D. HEYD, SUPEREROGATION (1982) and ref-
erences cited therein.
258. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
467 U.S. 837, 851 (1984) (the legislative history of the 1977 amendments to the
Clean Air Act plainly discloses that "Congress sought to accommodate the
conflict between the economic interest ... and the environmental interest in
improving air quality").
259. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum
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that the EPA need not insist upon every possible reduction if it
believes such insistence is counterproductive. 26 0 The funda-
mental idea is to make progress in view of circumstances, not to
insist upon perfection.
CONCLUSION
In environmental law, as in other forms of social regula-
tion, there are those who interpret legislation as an expression
of public values and ethical principles and those who, instead,
view legislation as a means to promote economic efficiency by
regulating markets. The obstacle that threatens to stall the na-
tion's efforts to combat pollution is the failure to reconcile
these two approaches.
Existing legislation, enacted in response to the public's
moral and cultural outrage over pollution, expresses the ethical
goal of eliminating pollution without regard to economic and
other practical constraints that may impede achievement of
that goal. In interpreting and implementing environmental leg-
islation, however, agencies and courts have become mired in
economic and technological considerations, often losing sight of
the ethical aspirations underlying the laws.
This Article has suggested that the present divergence be-
tween the ethical ends envisioned by environmental laws and
the practical means used to achieve those ends is not justified.
Means and ends must be deliberated over together, because all
moral deliberations that rise above the level of mere incanta-
tion consider and appraise ends in relation to the means by
which they can be achieved. If the goals set by current pollu-
tion control statutes are supererogatory given the resources
available to achieve those goals, it is morally permissible to re-
lax them. Indeed, failure to do so may cause the utopian envi-
ronment to which Americans aspire to become the formidable
enemy of the good environment Americans can achieve in fact.
Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646-52 (1980) (Benzene case) (the legislative history of
OSHA supports the conclusion that the statute required the elimination of any
significant risk of harm, not the making of a risk-free workplace).
260. See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 851-59 (the EPA's adoption of the "bub-
ble concept," based on a policy re-evaluation suggesting, among other things,
that the former policy hindered progress in pollution control by discouraging
the replacement of old equipment, was permissible under the language of the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970).
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